Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton County Clerk\u27s Record Dckt. 43527 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-17-2015
Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton County Clerk's
Record Dckt. 43527
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton County Clerk's Record Dckt. 43527" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 6080.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6080
K 
N TfiE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho corporation, and 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC., an Idaho limited liability company 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants/Appellan~ 
vs 
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho 
Defendant/Counterclaimant/Respondenl 
Appealed from the Distr"ct Court of the ------=Se="-ve=n=th'-'---- Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for ___ T .... e=to=n _______ County 
.... ~=on"""'o"""ra=b=le=-=Da=n ...... e._.H""". __ w'"""'a=t=ki.:...:;ns,....., ..... J.:..:.r. _________ District Judge 
Brook B. Bond, Esq. 800 W Main Street Suite 1300 Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Appellants 
Kathy Spitzer, Esq. 230 Main Suite 125 Driggs. Idaho 83422 
Attom0 y for Respondent 
Fil d 111. day of . 20 __ 
z; 
rt Noll 
Teton Coun No" CV 65 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho Corporation, and 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC., an Idaho limited liability company 
Pia i ntiffs/ Cou nterdefenda nts/ Appellants 
vs 
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of the subdivision 
of the State of Idaho 
Defendant/Counterclaimant/Respondent 
Brook B. Bolld, Esq. 
800 West Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Appellants 
Kathy Spitzer, Esq. 
230 N Main Street, Suite 125 
Driggs, Idaho 83422 
Attorney for Respondents 
5/21/201 
6/3/2013 
6/4/2013 
6/11/2013 
6/21/2013 
6/26/2013 
7/5/2013 
8/1/2013 
8/20/2013 
10/11/2013 
5/19/2014 
6/2/2014 
7/22/2014 
8/11/2014 
NCOC 
ATRE 
SMIS 
SMRT 
AFFD 
MOTN 
ORDR 
ATRE 
ANSW 
ORDR 
ORDR 
MISC 
NOTS 
MISC 
NOTS 
AFFD 
HRSC 
MOTN 
MEMO 
AFFD 
MOTN 
MEMO 
SHILL 
SHILL 
SHILL 
SHILL 
GABBY 
GABBY 
PHYLLIS 
PHYLLIS 
GABBY 
GABBY 
GABBY 
PHYLLIS 
PHYLLIS 
PHYLLIS 
PHYLLIS 
SHILL 
PHYLLIS 
PHYLLIS 
SHILL 
PHYLUS 
SHILL 
SHILL 
SHILL 
SHILL 
SHILL 
3-0000165 Current Dane Watkins 
Burns etaL vs. Teton 
New Case Filed - Other Claims Gregory W Moeller 
Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Gregory W Moeller 
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Moffatt Thomas Receipt number: 
0053795 Dated: 5/21/2013 Amount: $96.00 
(Check) For: Burns Concrete (plaintiff) 
Plaintiff: Bums Concrete Attorney Retained 
Robert B Burns 
Summons Issued 
Summons Returned 
Affidavit Of Service 
Motion for Disqualification Without Cause 
Order for Disqualification without Cause 
Defendant: Teton County, Attorney Retained 
Kathy Spitzer 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Gregory W Moeller 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Spitzer, 
Kathy (attorney for Teton County,) Receipt 
number: 0053996 Dated: 6/11/2013 Amount: 
$.00 (Cash) For: Teton County, (defendant) 
Answer & Counterclaim Gregory W Moeller 
Order of Assignment Gregory W Moeller 
Order of Assignment Corrected Copy Dane Watkins Jr 
Reply to Counterclaim Dane Watkins Jr 
Notice Of Service of Discovery (Plaintiffs' First Dane Watkins Jr 
Set of Discovery Requests to Defendant) 
Defendants Objections and Responses to Dane Watkins Jr 
Plaintiffs' First Set of Discovery Requests to 
Defendant 
Notice Of Service of Discovery Dane Watkins Jr 
Notice of Proposed Dismissal Dane Watkins Jr 
Affidavit of Robert B Burns Dane Watkins Jr 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Dane Watkins Jr 
08/21/2014 08:30 AM) 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Dane Watkins Jr 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Dane Watkins Jr 
Partiai Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Kimberly D Evans Ross Dane Watkins Jr 
Motion to File Amended Reply to Counterclaim Dane Watkins Jr 
Memorandum in of Motion to Dane Watkins 
Amended to Counterclaim 
th Judicial District -
Time: 
Case: CV-2013-0000165 Current 
Burns 
User Judge 
8/21/2014 MINE PHYLLIS Minute Entry Dane Watkins 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 8/21/2014 
Time: 8:38 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen 
Tape Number: 
Kimberly EVans Ross, Plaintiffs Counsel 
Kathy Spitzer, Defendants Counsel 
DCHH PHYLLIS Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Dane Watkins Jr 
on 08/21/2014 08:30 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated at: 
HRSC PHYLLIS Hearing Scheduled (Motions 11/20/201410:00 Dane Watkins Jr 
AM) for Summary Judgment 
8/22/2014 MINE PHYLLIS Minute Entry Dane Watkins Jr 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 8/21/2014 
Time: 8:26 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen 
Tape Number: 
8/28/2014 1\lf""\Tf"" l~Vlv SHiLL Notice of Change of Address Dane Watkins Jr 
8/29/2014 NOTC GABBY Notice Of Change Of Address Dane Watkins Jr 
9/18/2014 MOTN GABBY Motion For Summary Judgment Dane Watkins Jr 
AFFD GABBY Affidavit Of Kathy Spitzer Dane Watkins Jr 
9/19/2014 NOTH GABBY Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion To File Amended Dane Watkins Jr 
Reply To Counterclaim 
10/21/2014 MEMO GABBY Memorandum In Reply To Plaintiffs Motion For Dane Watkins Jr 
Partial Summary Judgment 
11/5/2014 AFFD PHYLLIS Affidavit of Kirk Bums Dane Watkins Jr 
MEMO PHYLLIS Memorandum in Opposition to Teton County's Dane Watkins Jr 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
11/12/2014 MISC GABBY Reply In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Dane Watkins Jr 
Summary Judgment 
NOTC GABBY Notice Of Errata Dane Watkins Jr 
Date 
11/20/201 MINE PHYLLIS Minute Entry Dane Watkins Jr 
Hearing type: Motions 
Hearing date: 11/20/2014 
Time: 10:05 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen 
Tape Number: 
Plaintiffs Attorney Emily Evans Ross 
Defendant's Attorney Kathy Spitzer 
ADVS PHYLLIS Hearing result for Motions scheduled on Dane Watkins Jr 
11/20/2014 10:00 AM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement for Summary Judgment 
DCHH PHYLLIS Hearing result for Motions scheduled on Dane Watkins Jr 
11/20/201410:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated at: for Summary Judgment Less than 
200 
12/2/2014 ORDR SHILL Order Granting Plailntiffs' Motion to File Amended Dane Watkins Jr 
Pleading 
12/19/201 MEMO PHYLLIS Memorandum Decison and Order Re: Motions for Dane Watkins Jr 
Summary Judgment 
12/29/2014 MISC SHILL Amended Reply to Counterclaim Dane Watkins Jr 
12/31/2014 MEMO SHILL Defendant's Memorandum of Costs and Claim for Dane Watkins Jr 
Attorney Fees 
1/20/2015 MOTN SHILL Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Dane Watkins Jr 
Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motions 
for Summary Judgment 
MEMO SHILL Memorandum in Support of Motion for Dane Watkins Jr 
Reconsideration 
3/18/2015 ORDR PHYLLIS Order Setting Costs ($22,348.00) Dane Watkins Jr 
5/4/2015 NOTC SHILL Notice of Hearing RE: Motion for Reconsideration Dane Watkins Jr 
of Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motions 
for Summary Judgment 
MOTN SHILL Motion for Leave to Appear T elephonically Dane Watkins Jr 
HRSC SHILL Hearing Scheduled (Motions 06/04/2015 01 :30 Dane Watkins Jr 
PM) 
9/2015 MEMO SHILL Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion Dane Watkins Jr 
for Reconsideration 
5/28/2015 ORDR SHILL Order Granting Motion for Leave to Appear Dane Watkins Jr 
Telephonically 
6/1/2015 MISC SHILL Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Dane Watkins Jr 
Reconsideration 
SHILL Certificate of Service of Order Dane Watkins Jr 
Motion Leave 
Date: District -
Time: ROA 
3-0000165 Current 
User 
PHYLLIS Minute Entry Dane Watkins Jr 
Hearing type: Motions 
Hearing date: 6/4/2015 
Time: 1:38 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen 
Tape Number: 
Plaintiffs Attorney Kimberly Evans Ross 
Defendant's Attorney Kathy Spitzer 
DCHH PHYLLIS Hearing result for Motions scheduled on Dane Watkins Jr 
06/04/2015 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated at: 
ADVS PHYLLIS Case Taken Under Advisement Dane Watkins Jr 
6/24/2015 MEMO PHYLLIS Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Dane Watkins Jr 
Reconsideration 
6/30/2015 MEMO GABBY Defendant's Memorandum Of Costs And Claim Dane Watkins Jr 
For Attorney Fees 
7/9/2015 SUBC PHYLLIS Notice of Substitution Of Counsel Dane Watkins Jr 
7/13/2015 JDMT PHYLLIS Final Judgment Dane Watkins Jr 
CDIS PHYLLIS Civil Disposition entered for: Teton County,, Dane Watkins Jr 
Defendant; Burns Concrete, Plaintiff; Burns 
Holdings, LLC, Plaintiff. Filing date: 7/13/2015 
CSCP PHYLLIS Case Status Closed But Pending: Closed Dane Watkins Jr 
8/21/2015 SHILL Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Dane Watkins Jr 
Supreme Court Paid by: Parsons Behle 
Receipt number: 0060576 Dated: 8/21/2015 
Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Burns Concrete 
(plaintiff) and Burns Holdings, LLC (plaintiff) 
NOTC SHILL Notice of Appeal Dane Watkins Jr 
SHILL Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copies Of Dane Watkins Jr 
Transcripts For Appeal Per Page Paid by: Parson, 
Beh!e Receipt number: 0060577 Dated: 
8/21/2015 Amount $200.00 (Check) 
3/24/2015 RVOI PHYLLIS Receipt Voided (Receipt# 60577 dated Dane Watkins Jr 
8/21/2015) 
BNDC PHYLLIS Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 60584 Dated Dane Watkins Jr 
8/24/2015 for 200.00) 
BONC PHYLLIS Condition of Bond: payment for Clerk's record Dane Watkins 
0/16/2015 BNDC Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 60992 Dated Dane Watkins jr 
10/16/2015 for 98.25) 
BONC PHYLLIS Condition of Bond: for final of Clerk's Dane Watkins 
Record 
Answer and filed June 2013 025 
Reply to Counterclaim, filed July 2013 Page 041 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed August 11, 2014 Page 047 
Affidavit of Kimberly D. Evans Ross, filed August 11, 2014 Page 050 
Court Minutes, filed August 21, 2014 Page 063 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 18, 2014 Page 065 
Affidavit of Kathy Spitzer, filed September 18, 2014 Page 067 
Affidavit of Kirk Burns, filed November 5, 2014 Page 088 
Memorandum in Opposition to Teton County's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed November 5, 2014 Page 094 
Court Minutes, filed November 20, 2014 Page 109 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to File Amended Pleading, filed December 2, 2014 Page 116 
Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motions for Summary Judgment 
filed December 19, 2014 Page 118 
Amended Reply to Counterclaim, filed December 29, 2014 Page 143 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum Decision and 
Order RE: Motions for Summary Judgment, filed January 20, 2015 Page 150 
Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, filed June 1, 2015 Page 153 
Court Minutes, filed June 4, 2015 Page 165 
Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motion for Reconsideration, filed June 24, 2015 Page 168 
Final Judgment, filed July 13, 2015 Page 185 
Notice of Appeal, filed August, 21, 2015 Page 187 
Clerk1 s of Service 194 
ii 
Evans 2014 
Affidavit of Kirk Burns, filed November 5, 2014 
Amended Reply to Counterclaim, filed December 29, 2014 
Answer and Counterclaim, filed June 11, 2014 
Certificate of Exhibits, dated September 30, 2015 
Certificate of Service, date October 16, 2105 
Clerk's Certificate of Service 
Court Minutes, filed August 21, 2014 
Court Minutes, filed June 4, 2015 
Court Minutes, filed November 20, 2014 
Final Judgment, filed July 13, 2015 
Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motion for Reconsideration, filed June 24, 2015 
Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motions for Summary Judgment 
filed December 19, 2014 
Memorandum in Opposition to Teton County's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed November 5, 2014 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 18, 2014 
Notice of Appeal, filed August, 21, 2015 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Filed Amended Pleading, filed December 2, 2014 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed August 11, 2014 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum Decision and 
Order RE: Motions for Summary Judgment, filed January 20, 2015 
iii 
050 
Page 088 
Page 143 
Page 025 
Page 192 
Page 193 
Page 194 
Page 063 
Page 165 
Page 109 
Page 185 
Page 168 
Page 118 
Page094 
Page 065 
Page 187 
Page 116 
Page 047 
001 
iv 
900 View Dnve Suite 
Post Office Box 51505 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone (208) 522-6700 
Facsimile (208) 111 
rbb@rnoffatt.com 
kde@moffatt.com 
1 
for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE OF IDAHO, 
CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TETON COlJNTY, a political subdivision of 
the State ofidaho, 
Defendant. 
FOR 
VERIFIED COMPLAiNT FOR: 
(i) DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, 
(ii) BREACH OF CONTRACT AND 
RESCISSION, (iii) UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT 
Fee Category: A 
Fee: $96.00 
Plaintiffs Burns Concrete, foe. and Burns Holdings, LLC (jointly, "Bums" or 
"Developer"), as their complaint in this against Defendant Teton County, allege as 
follows: 
5, as 9 
2. true and correct copy of the recorded Agreement is attached hereto as 
Exhibit l and incorporated herein by reference. 
3. Bums now seeks (a) a decree that Teton County is estopped from rezoning 
property described m the Agreement and that the time for constructing the "Pennanent 
Facility" defined in the Agreement has been tolled since November 15, , when the Teton 
Board of County Commissioners first voted to deny issuance of the land use approvals 
required construction of the Pennanent F ac11ity; (b) a decree establishing Teton County's 
repudiation and material breach and Burns' the 
judgment against Teton for all damages incurred Bums 
-""''-""" together 
to or arising out 
of the Agreen1ent; and ( c) in the event the Agreement should be held to be void or voidable by 
County, judgment agamst Teton County for restitution damages in an amount equal to the 
benefits by which Teton County was unjustly enriched as a result the public improvements 
constructed by Burns pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. 
PARTIES 
4. Burns Concrete, Inc. is an Idaho corporation engaged in the manufacture 
and sale of concrete, and Burns Holdings, LLC is an Idaho limited liability company engaged in 
holding property, two companies being common ownership and 
-2 
§ 
8. The real property subjected to Agreement is located within the Area of 
of the City Dnggs, Teton County, Idaho and described in Exhibit to the 
(the "Property"). 
9. Pursuant to Paragraph 1 (titled, Zoning Ordinance Amendment) of the 
Agreement, Teton County agreed to "adopt an ordinance amending the Driggs Arna ofirnpact 
Zoning Map to rezone the property to Ml." The Property was thereafter rezoned by Teton 
to Industrial). 
10. Pursuant to Paragraph 2 (titled, on 
The use allowed and restrictions pursuant to this 
conditional rezone as reflected this Agreement are 
a. The property shall be used exclusively for the 
operation of a ready-mix concrete manufacturing plant 
b. . . . . This development and operation shall be 
subject to the following terms and conditions, in addition to the 
other tenns hereof: 
(i) Developer intends to operate a Ready-Mix Concrete 
Manufacturing Facility (a "Facility") on the property. 
(ii) All operations on the property shall comply with all 
applicable and governing local, state or US. ordinances and laws 
relating to dust, noise, water quality and quality. 
's 
(v) In order to facilitate and supp01i the construction 
the Pennanent Facility and to Developer to expedite 
commercial operations, the Developer shall erect and a 
temporary concrete batch plant on site as shown in Exhibit "B" -
Site Plan and Exhibit "D''. 
(vi) In the event that the Permanent Facility is not 
completed within the time allowed herein, the County shall have 
the right to revoke the authority to operate the Temporary Facility. 
The grant of authority Facility is to allow 
Developer to operate Developer's business until the Permanent 
is constructed. The authority to operate 
Facility shall tem1inate completion of the Pemunent 
sooner (18) U,CJHCH 
italics added.) 
11. Pursuant to Paragraph 5 (titled, Reversion 
The execution of this Agreement shall be deemed written 
consent by Developer to change the zoning of the subject property 
to its prior designation upon failure to comply with the conditions 
imposed by this Agreement. No reversion shall take place until 
a on matter to Code §67-651 
Upon notice and hearing, as provided in this Agreement and in 
Idaho Code §67-6509, if the property described in attached 
Exhibit "A" is not used as approved, or if the approved use ends 
or is abandoned, the Board of County Commissioners may, upon 
receiving a recommendation from the City's governing board, 
order th.at the property will revert to the. designation ( and 
land uses allowed by that zoning designation) existing HUUCv·~ 
to 
(Italics added.) 
8 
its terms or -~cc,~•·•~a~, 
breaching party not 
in writing, unless an exists threatening the health and 
safety of the public. If such an emergency exists, written 
shall be given in a reasonable time and manner in light of the 
circumstances of the breach. The time of the giving of the notice 
shall be measured from the date of the written Notice of Default. 
The Notice of Default shall specifj1 the nature of the alleged default 
and, where appropriate, the manner and period of time during 
which said default may be satisfactorily cured. During any period 
of curing, the party charged shall not be considered in default for 
the purposes of termination or zoning reversion, or the institution 
oflegal proceedings. If the default is cured, then no default shall 
exist and the charging party shall take no further action. 
13. Finally, pursuant to Paragraph 12.b of the Agreement, Agreement runs 
Property in perpetuity, and inures to the JS by 
its assigns. 
GENERAJ_, ALLEGATIONS 
Paragraph 2.b(iii) and Exhibit C of the Agreement expressly provide 
and depict Bums' construction ofits desired 75-foot "Permanent Facility." 
15. In accordance with Teton County's requirements, the City of Driggs' 
Plam1ing and Zoning Commission heard on July 11, 2007 and unanimously reco1mnended for 
approval by Teton County both the Agreement and the issuance of a conditional use permit 
allowing the 75-foot height of the Permanent Facility (the "CUP"). 
16. Thereafter, on or about August 31, 2007 Teton County and Burns 
into the Teton County to be recorded. 
concrete 
Burns to incur substantial 
for prior waste disposal, clearing and grubbing the site, extending utilities to the and 
transporting to and erecting on the site the Temporary Facility; (b) constructing the road and 
highway improvements required under Paragraph 2.d(iv) of the Agreement, which required 
Bums to incur substantial expense for barrier fencing with concrete foundations, new turn lanes, 
landscaping, and performance bonds; and (c) applying for and taking all actions necessary to 
obtain the CUP and variance required to construct the Pennanent Facility. 
18. After Burns had incurred substantial costs required Agreement, 
notwithstanding unanimous recommendation for approval by the 
the determination Teton County's that 
Agreement was a valid and binding contract, the Teton County Board County Commissioners 
voted to deny the CUP on November 15, 2007. 
19. Burns confirmed with Teton County's director of planning zonmg, 
Kurt Hibbert, on November 20, 2007 that Teton County would not issue a building permit for the 
construction of the Permanent Facility specified in the Agreement. 
20. Bums has undertaken every act reasonably possible to obtain the C1JP and 
variance required by Teton County for Burns to construct the Permanent Facility, which CUP 
and variance Teton to issue. 
1 through 21. 
to operations into 
Burns met with representatives of both Teton County and the City of Driggs to 
detennine whether and where to construct a concrete batch plant in the area. All such 
representatives encouraged Burns to construct such a plant, with both Teton County and the City 
Driggs designating the Property as the specific site where Burns should construct it. 
Bums purchased the Property based on representations made Teton 
County and the and the reasonable expectancy into the 
a to 
Bums has operated and continues to operate Temporary 111 
accordance terms of Agreement. Bums cannot now and has not ever 
able to construct the Pennanent 
which Bums has 110 control. 
reason actions and · over 
26. Neve1iheless, by letter dated October 23, 2012 from the Teton County 
Prosecuting Attorney, Teton County resubmitted to the City ofDnggs a previously 
application a recommendation by the city that the zoning of the Property should revert to C3 
(Service and Highway Commercial). Although a final decision on the application was tabled by 
'Planning l 
to rezone Property remams 
s 
to 
paragraph 17, it be unconscionable to permit Teton County to rezone the ,.,,,.,,,",,,_" to C3 
Teton County should thus be estopped from doing so, 
28. Additionally, by letter dated November 5, 2012 from the Teton County 
Prosecuting Attorney to Bums' counsel, Teton County asserted that the clause in Paragraph 
of the Agreement extending the 18-month period to construct the Pennanent Facility "is 
inapplicable to the present situation" and threatened to file suit to force Bums' 
Temporary Facility from the Property. 
By reason of Teton efforts to rezone the 
to file suit to removal of the Temporary Facility, an actual existing 
its 
between Burns and Teton County with respect to whether (a) Teton County should 
estopped from rezonrng the Property for so long as Burns is not in material breach the 
the 
Agreement and (b) whether the time for constructing the Penn anent Facility been tolled since 
November 15, 2007, when the Teton County Board of County Commissioners first voted to deny 
issuance of CUP required for the construction of the Penn anent Facility, or such other date as 
the Court may detennine to be applicable. 
30. Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 10-1201 and J 0-1203, a determination of the 
respective rights Burns and Teton to 
to lS to 
1S 
construct 
to Pe1manent 
COUNT II 
(Breach of Contract and Rescission) 
31. Bums hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 30. 
By letter dated October 2012 from its Board of County Commissioners, 
removal Property. 
to s and demand, 
15, 2 
constituted a breach of Agreement and demanded the following: 
the County contends the Developer has breached or is in 
default of the Agreement, that the County provide the Developer 
"not thirty (30) days of Default, in writing 
... [and] specify the nature of the alleged default and, 
appropriate, the manner and period of time during which said 
default may be satisfactorily cured" in accordance with the 
requirements imposed under Paragraph 8 of the Agreement; 
(ii) no further to 
Developer's under the Agreement without first providing a 
written Notice of Default and opp01iunity to cure the alleged 
default - as is expressly reqmred by Paragraph 8 the Agreement; 
and 
(iii) That the County provide 
of its notice 
Burns 
s 
to rezone as 26, (b) 
5,2012 the Teton County Prosecuting to Bums' counsel, rej all 
demands made by Burns and threatening to file suit to compel Bums' removal 
Temporary Facility 
repudiated 
36. 
the Prope1iy. 
By undertaking the action alleged in above paragraph 34, Teton County 
c:.ca,v,,0 under and materially breached the Agreement. 
therefore seeks judgment rescinding the Agreement and awarding 
the damages it incurred as a result of its reasonable expectations of entering into 
on under the Agreement, m 
COUNT III 
(Unjust Enrichment) 
amount to 
1 through 
38. Bums' construction of the road and highway improvements alleged in 
above paragraph 17 conferred a benefit upon Teton County that would be inequitable for it to 
without payment. 
Accordingly, in the event the Agreement should be held to be void or 
at 
voidable by Teton seeks judgment awarding it restitution damages, in amount 
to at 
costs. 
Burns prays for judgment as follows: 
1. for a decree enjoining Teton County from rezoning the Property for so 
as Bums is not in material breach of the Agreement; 
2. for a decree establishing that 18-month period to construct 
Facility specified in the Agreement has been and remains tolled; 
3. for a decree establishing Teton County's material breach and 
of the Agreement, together with an award damages Bums incuued; 
4. m the event the held to be an 
ofrestitution 
5. mcluding reasonable 
incuued by Burns; 
6. for such other and additional as may be just 
DATED this 
-1{ 7 - day of May 2013. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
fees, 
) 
duly sworn, deposes 
in the above-entitled proceeding, and the 
limited liability company named the above-entitled proceeding, and is authorized to make 
verification in their behalf. 
He has read the foregoing COMPLAINT, knows the contents 
thereof, and the same are true to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _jQ_ day of May, 13. 
(\ 
2007-09-05 No. Pages: 
Recorded for: BURNS CONCRET 
MARY LOU HANSEN 
Ex-Officio Recorder Deputy 
!nde-:r to. AGREEMENT 
,-r 
On the~ day of ---/\ '-4- u----;::\ , 2007, Teton County, Idaho (hereinafter 
referred to as "County"), and ~ms Holdings, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company 
(hereinafter referred to as "Developer"), the owner of the real property described in the 
attached E~hibit nA 11 enter into the following agreement: 
\VHEREAS, the Developer has applied for a zone change from C3, Service and 
Highway Commercial to M 1, Light Industrial, for certain real property described in 
Exhibit II N', attached hereto and located in the City of Driggs Area of Impact, Teton 
County Idaho, and hereinafter referred to as "the property"; and 
WHEREAS, the Developer has requested the zone change for the purpose of 
developing a concrete batch plant facility on the property; and 
WHEREAS, the County, pursuant to Section 67 -6511 A, Idaho Code, has the 
authority to conditionally rezone and to enter into a development agreement for 
purpose of allowing, by agreement, a specific development to proceed in a specific area 
and for a specific purpose or use which is appropriate in the area, but for which all allowed 
uses for L11e requested zoning may not be appropriate pursuant to the Idaho Code and the 
City of Driggs Zoning Ordinance, adopted by the County as the official zoning ordinance 
for the Driggs Area 1mpact; and 
\VHEREAS, the County and the Developer desire to formalize and clarify the 
respective obligations of the parties, it is agreed as follows: 
1. Zoning Ordinance Amendment: The City of Driggs (hereinafter referred to as 
"City") recommended approval of, and the County hereby grants, the zone change to M 
1, Light Industrial, for the property, and will adopt an ordinance amending the Driggs Area 
of Impact Zoning Map to rezone the property to Ml. 
2. Conditions on Development: The sole use allowed and restrictions pursuant to 
this conditional rezone as reflected in this Agreement are as follows: 
! - of Bums LL.C. Zone 
a. shall a 
concrete manufacturing facility. 
b. At the current cirne the property has been re-zoned to M 1, Light 
as described in paragraph 1. above. Part of such approval and recommendation 
was based upon execution of this development agreement to identify responsibilities and 
obligations pertaining to certain matters relating to the improvement and operation of the 
property. This development .and operation shall be subject to the following terms and 
conditions, in addition to the other terms hereof: 
(i) Developer intends to operate a Ready-Mix Concrete 
Manufacturing Facility (a "Facility") on the property. 
(ii) All operations on the property shall comply with all applicable 
and local, state or U.S. ordinances and laws relating to dust, water quality 
and air quality. 
as " - Site Plan, and 
Building Elevations, and this reference incorporated herein are plans of 
Developer's intended permanent facility ("Permanent Facility 
Immediately upon execution of this Agreement, Developer shall 
order and commence construction of the Permanent Facility. The installation of the 
Permanent Faciliry shall completed within eighteen (18) months execution of this 
Agreement by the County, subject to delays resulting from weather, strikes, shortage of 
steel or manufacturing equipment or any other act of force majeure or action beyond 
Developer's control. 
(v) In order to facilitate and support the construction of the 
Permanent Facility and to allow the Developer to expedite commercial operations, the 
Developer shall erect and operate a temporary concrete batch plant on site as sho\,vn in 
Exhibit ;, B" Site Plan and Exhibit "D". 
(vi) In the event that the Permanent Facility is not completed within 
Counry shall have the right to to operate 
The of aurhority Temporary is to allov,, 
The 
2 Burns 'l lj 
shall 
Facility even if sooner than che described eighteen (18) month time 
c. The access to the property from State Highway 33 shall be via Casper 
, which shall be improved to City of Driggs Public Works Standards and 
Specifications, as shown in the construction drawings submitted by Developer and held by 
City of Driggs, prior to operation of the Temporary Facility. 
d. To assure compatibility with other surrounding uses the following 
matters have been addressed and agreed upon for the Permanent Facility as 
follows: 
(i) related issues will be addressed by construction of 
concrete block eight and three-quarters feet . 7 5 ') in height along 
the property, as shown tn Exhibit B - Site Plan and enclosure the 
a as m C 
(ii) Dust will be controlled through paving of the area around the 
enclosure of the Batch Plant Equipment within a building, a truck wash for 
trucks utilized by the Facility and a dust collection system on the Batch Plant. In addition, 
the Facility will have an air quality permit from the Idaho Department of Environmental 
· and comply with the requirements 
(iii) Hours of operation shall not be restricted as this 1s consistent 
with the provisions for M 1 and C3 zoning. The property is surrounded by property zoned 
M 1 and C3. The construction business activities of the Facility sometimes require varying 
hours of operation due to the nature of the construction industry. 
(iv) Traffic issues shall be mitigated by construction of 
improvements on Casper Drive as described herein and the implementation of 
improvements on Highway 33 as required by the Idaho Department of Transportation. 
(v) 
wall 
of 
Landscaping on the 
will 
(1 
of a block 
The east boundary of the 
t] 
if the future planned area 1s 
- Block Wall Planter Detaii. 
(vi) Lighting issues shall be mitigated by using cut-off fixtures that 
direct the light downward rather than flood lighting. 
3. Indemnity: Developer agrees to, and does hereby, defend, hold harmless and 
indemnify the City and County, all associated elected and appointed officials, officers, 
employees, agents, representatives, and attorneys, from any and all claims that may, at any 
time, be asserted against any such parties in connection with: 
a. the City's or County's review and approval of any plans or 
improvements, or the issuance any approvals, permits, certificates, or 
relating to the use andior development the property; 
b. the 
c. the County of 
related ordinances, , or other 
maintenance of property; 
obligations under this 
; and 
d. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the indemnification terms of this 
paragraph 3 shall not extend or apply to the failure of the County to follow, in good faith, 
law or ordinances. 
4. : This Agreement may be modified onJy by a written 
document, signed by the parties, or their successors in interest, after complying with the 
notice and hearing procedures of Idaho Code §67-6509 and of the Driggs Zoning 
Ordinance. 
5. : The execution of this Agreement shall 
written consent by Developer to change the zoning of the subject property to its prior 
designation upon failure to comply with the conditions imposed by this Agreement. No 
reversion shall take place until after a hearing on this matter pursuant to Idaho Code §67-
l lA. Upon . as ided in · and in Idaho Code §67-
property described in attached , or if 
or is 
a recommendation City's governing board, that the · l 
revert to the zoning designation (and iand uses aiiowed by that zoning designation) existing 
immediately prior to the rezone action, i.e., the property shall revert back to rhe C3, 
Service and Highway Commercial zoning designation. 
6. · The County may, while this Agreement is in effect, annually 
review the extent of good faith substantial compliance with the tem1s of this Agreement. 
Developer shall have the duty to demonstrate Developer's good faith compliance with the 
terms of this Agreement during such review. 
7. · Developer shall comply with all commitments set out in this 
Agreement. Developer shall timely and satisfactorily carry out al1 required performance to 
appropriately maintain, in the discretion of the County, all commitments set forth in this 
Agreement. 
8. · In the event of a default or breach of this Agreement 
or its terms or conditions, the party default shall the breaching party 
not than thirty (30) days Notice of Default, writing, unless an emergency exists 
threatening the health and safety of the public. If such an emergency exists, written notice 
shall be given in a reasonable time and manner in light of the circumstances of the breach. 
The time of the giving of notice shall be measured from the date of the written Notice of 
Default. The Notice of Default shall specify the nature of the alleged default and, where 
appropriate, the manner and period of time during which said default may be satisfactorily 
cured. During any period of curing, the party charged shall not be considered in default for 
the purposes of termination or zoning reversion, or the institution of legal proceedings. If 
the default is cured, then no default shall exist and the charging party shall take no further 
action. 
9. Termination: This Agreement may be terminated in accordance with notice 
and hearing procedures ofidaho Code §67-6509, and the zoning designation upon which the 
use is based reversed, upon failure of Developer, a subsequent owner, or other person 
acquiring an interest in the property described in attached Exhibit "A" to comply with the 
terms this Agreement. 
: Burns Zone l] 
's to 
Developer to an 
jurisdiction. 
11. : Any reference to laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, or 
resolutions shall include such iaws, ordinances, rules, regulations, or resolutions as have 
been, to the date of this agreement, or as they may then be in force in the future with 
respect to proposed amendments to this Agreement in the future. 
12. 
a. The parties agree that the relationship created by the agreement is 
solely that a private Developer and the City. Nothing in this agreement shall create the 
Developer or City as an agent, employer, employee, legal representative, partner or 
subsidiary of the other. 
b. The that shall run with the land and bind 
in perpetuity, and shall iimre to the benefit be enforceable by the 
any of their respective legal representatives, heirs, successors, and 
c. All notice must be in writing, mailed in the U.S. Mail certified mail 
to the addresses indicated on this agreement. 
d. This agreement shall be construed and enforced pursuant to the laws of 
the State of Idaho. 
e. If any party shall bring suit against the other party to enforce this 
agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
f. If any term of this agreement is declared invalid, illegal or 
unenforceable, the remainder of this agreement shall remain operative and binding. 
g. The Developer hereby guarantees the prompt and 
correction all defects or deficiencies in the improvements that occur or 
period 
or 
l J 
defect ten days after written from the City. The Developer 
proceed w1th reasonable diligence to correct the defect or deficiency. guaranty 
shall be extended one full year from the date of repair or replacement of any improvement 
made pursuant to this paragraph. 
h. This agreement shall be signed in duplicate originals. Each party shall 
receive one original of this agreement. 
i. The County shall have this agreement recorded in the office of the 
Teton County Clerk. 
AGREED: 
Teton County, Idaho 
P.O. Box 
Driggs, Idaho 83422 
I (? 1/ By:~k~~ 
Courtjycjerk 
Developer: 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC 
7 . of Bums L.L.C. Zone l] 
FROl\:I INSTRUMENT NO. 183802 
TRACT l : FEE EST ATE 
LOT lB-W, TETON PEAKS VIEW SUBDIVISION, TETON COUNTY, IDAHO, PART 
OF THE \Vl/2.NEI/4, SECTION 23, TOWNSHIP 5 NORTH, RANGE45 EAST, BOISE 
MERJDIAN, TETON COUNTY, IDAHO, BEING FURTHER DESCRIBED AS: FROM 
THE Nl/4 CORNER OF SAID SECTION 23, SOUTH 975.63 AND EAST, 627.41 
FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING; THENCE SOUTH 510.00 TO A POINT; 
WEST 274.41 FEET TO A POINT; THENCE NORTH 510.00 TO A 
POINT; THENCE EAST 274.41 TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
j, 
£,. 
\VITH A UTILITY ALONG 
SOUTH SIDE OF REMAINDER LOT , AS SHOWN ON THE RECORD 
SURVEY RECORDED FEBRUARY 24, 1999 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 133115, 
RECORDS OF TETON COUNTY, IDAHO. 
INSTRlJl'v!ENT NO. 183803 
LOT TETON PEAKS VIE\V SUBDIVISION, TETON COUNTY, IDAHO, BEING 
FURTHER DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: PART OF THE Wl/2NE1/4 SECTION 23, 
TO\VNSHIP 5 NORTH, RANGE 45 EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, TETON COUNTY, 
IDAHO, BEING FURTHER DESCRIBED AS: FROM THE Nl/4 CORNER OF SAID 
, SOUTH 975.63 AND .41 FEET TO POINT OF 
BEGINNING. THENCE EAST 274.60 FEET TO A POINT; THENCE SOUTH 510.00 
FEET TO A POINT; THENCE WEST 274.60 FEET TO A POINT; THENCE NORTH 
510.00 TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
8 of Burns L. 
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Exhibit B 
Bums Holdings Driggs Site Plan Version 9.5 
r . ~ --~---
~--- ---A-g-gr-eg-a-le-·S- lo- r-ag_e _ ___ _ _ _ _ ____ _.1 -
~R::_ 
i 
ro O' 
I 
I I T eflW(aff Plar~ ~1 
I See Exhibit D 
I 
L~- ~ -+'-"--~ 
Paved Area 
... 
' 
= Paved Roadway 
= Paved Area Of Facility 
Ill) = Shrubery 
"""' = Block Wall 
H'q, Bay { C.U.P. ) 
a • auuuu,nmm 
- ·.1...--- --,: 
Temper Waler Stations 
1 
I 
160'' 
l 
I 
. J'_, 
70' 
11 
... . . ---- -- :,11, 
=;.....;'. • .. -: 
-Y l- .S //~ 11 f I 
-- ~ m.oco G:i. Flo= !\'ta~ 
I~ 1' 
;n.,""'4>\,a ... 
Wes\ Boundary 
Existing Trees 
E 
N s 
w 
Version 9.1 
State Highway 33 
f) ;:i \ 
549' 
l 
Easement 
-< 60' >-
I 
.'i 
-EAST ELEVATION 
NORTH ELEVATION 
EXHIB T 
SOUTH ELEVATION 
WEST ELEVATION 
n en 
---- · ---- -
r6 (°{) 
0 
BUILDING ELEVATIONS 
m 
>< 
::J'"' 
-~ 
cr 
0 
-
VIEW AT WEST BOUNDARY 
-
VIEW AT CASPER DRIVE 
EXHIBI~r " E II 
VIEW AT WEST BOUNDARY 
''VIEW AT NORTHWEST CORNER 
r 
( 
ANDFOR 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., AN IDAHO CaseNo. CV-1 165 
AND BURNS HOLDINGS, 
Plaintiff, ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
v. 
Defendant. 
By and through counsel record, Defendant Teton County, Idaho submits 
as an to s "Complaint"). answenng 
this Complaint, Defendant expressly reserves, in addition to the defenses set forth below, 
defenses provided for or authorized by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and all 
defenses provided by Moreover, Defendant states their investigation 
as 
L 
which an answer is extent an answer is 
to 
admits that 
a document entitled s Agreement for Holdings, was recorded as 
Instrument #191250 on September 
Concrete. 
2007 in Teton County at the request of Burns 
2. Admitted. 
3. Paragraph 3 does not contain factual allegations to which an answer 1s 
required. 
the same. 
so as there are any factual allegations in Paragraph Defendant denies 
4. Defendant that Burns 
Burns Holdings, LLC is an Idaho 
knowledge or information sufficient to 
two companies. 
to 
is an Idaho 
Compa11~y. 1s without 
a as to the relationship between the 
5. Defendant admits that it is a political subdivision of the State ofldaho. 
to Jurisdiction Venue 
6. Admitted. 
7. Admitted. 
to 
8. 
10. 1 to 
11. The document attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Complaint speaks for 
itself, and no response is required. 
12. The document attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Complaint speaks for 
itself, and no response is required. 
13. The document attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Complaint speaks for 
and no is required. 
14. 
to 
attached as 
itself, and no response is required. 
15. Admitted. 
16. Admitted that the 
office of the Teton County Clerk. 
Allegations 
1 to s for 
was entered into and it is recorded in the 
17. Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
as to the allegations 
Paragraph. 
this Paragraph and therefore denies the allegations in this 
] 8. Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
as to what costs were that the Teton Board 
to on 5, 
any as to 
and denied that he opinion at as to the validity or 
enforceability the Agreement relation to the conditional use permit which was the 
subject the November 15, 2007 hearing. 
19. Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
as to the allegations 
Paragraph. 
this Paragraph and therefore denies the allegations in this 
as to 
zone 
20. Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
21. 
has undertaken act reasonably possible to obtain the CUP and 
a CUP in their 
that Burns cannot construct a 
admits that 
for a 
was denied 
years 
foot building in the M-1 
in the Driggs' Area of Impact without an amendment to the ordinances 
Teton County. Denied that Burns has no control over such amendment. 
to Count 
22. Defendant hereby incorporates by reference its responses to Paragraphs 1-
21 of Complaint herein, as if set forth in full. 
Defendant is without knowledge or information 
as to the allegations in this Paragraph and therefore 
Paragraph. 
the this 
The statements in paragraph 25 are conclusions of law and not factual 
allegations and therefore no answer is required. In so far as there are any factual 
allegations in Paragraph 25, Defendant denies the same. 
26. Admitted. 
27. The statements in paragraph 27 are conclusions of law and not factual 
and therefore no answer is required. so far as there are factual 
Defendant denies same. 
28. Admitted. 
The statements in paragraph 29 are conclusions not factl1al 
allegations and therefore no answer is required. In so far as there are any factual 
allegations in Paragraph 29, Defendant denies the same. 
30. The statements in paragraph 30 are conclusions of law and not factual 
allegations therefore no answer is required. In so far as there are any factual 
allegations in Paragraph 30, Defendant denies the same. 
to Count 
31. incorporates its to Paragraphs 
set m 
35 are and not 
allegations therefore no answer 1s required. In so as are factual 
allegations in Paragraph 35, Defendant denies the same. 
36. statements in paragraph 36 are conclusions of law and not factual 
allegations and therefore no answer is required. In so far as there are any factual 
allegations in Paragraph 36, Defendant denies the same. 
37. 
of the 
Answers to Count 
Defendant hereby incorporates by reference 
herein, as if set forth in full. 
statements paragraph 3 8 are 
to Paragraphs 
law and not factual 
allegations therefore no answer is required. so far as there are any 
allegations Paragraph 38, Defendant denies the same. 
39. The statements in paragraph 3 9 are law and not factual 
allegations and therefore no answer is required. In so far as there are any factual 
allegations in Paragraph 3 9, Defendant denies the same. 
to Attorney Fees 
40. The statements in paragraph 40 are conclusions of law and not factual 
allegations and therefore no answer 1s required. In so far as there are any factual 
allegations in Paragraph Defendant same. 
cause to 
state a cause of action against Defendant. 
Defendant alleges that by the filing of this action Complainant is pursuing a 
frivolous claim that is totally and wholly without merit or justification and by reason 
thereof, Defendant is entitled to its attorney fees and an award of sanctions against 
Complainant and his attorney. 
THIRD AFFIRJYIATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs to bring this cause of action within five (5) years after the claim 
arose or reasonable should have been discovered as by Idaho Code§ 5-216. 
Plaintiffs failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing this action 
m District 
Plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages, if any. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or part, by the doctrine of !aches. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant Teton County prays that the Court enter Judgment in 
its favor and that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, and that the Comi 
grant Defendant costs and as 1s 
7 
and Burns states and alleges as 
Count I 
of Contract 
1. Counterclaim Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference each and every 
allegation and answer contained in the above paragraphs. 
2. Counterclaim Defendant owm approximately 6.5 acres of property m 
Teton County, Idaho located at 175 N and 185N on State highway 33 (the "Property"). 
3. 
application 
from 
4. 
On February 26, 2007 Teton County granted Counterclaim Defendants 
a conditional zone change, altering the zoning designation on the Property 
to 1. 
rezone submitted was 
constructing a concrete batch plant on Bums' property located North of the City of 
5. As a condition of the rezoning the required 
written commitment (the "Agreement") concermng the use or development of the 
Property. 
6. The terms of the Agreement were negotiated by and between the 
Developer and the County and City planning administrators. 
7. In order to "facilitate and support construction the Permanent 
Facility and to allow Developer to expedite commercial operations," 
allowed for a 
Facility is to allow 
Permanent Facility is constructed. The authority to operate 
Facility shall terminate upon completion of the Permanent 
sooner than the described eighteen (18) month time period. 
(Italics added.) 
9. The Permanent Facility has never been constructed and the Temporary 
Facility has been in existence for over five (5) years. 
10. On April 9, 2012 Teton County provided Bums written notice 
revocation of Burns Holding's authority to operate the Temporary Facility. 
11. On October 4, 2012 Teton County again provided Burns written notice of 
revocation of Burns Holding's authority to operate the Temporary Facility. 
12. has refused to comply s revocation authority 
13. to Paragraph 2(b )(iv) of the 
concrete plant, the "Permanent Facility" was to be complete eighteen (18) months 
from date of execution the Agreement, August 31, 
14. According to Paragraph 2(b)(iv) of the Agreement, the only matters which 
could delay the eighteen (18) month completion period were those "resulting from 
weather, strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or any other act force 
majeure or actions beyond the Developer's control." 
15. Weather, strikes, shortage of steel, or manufacturing equipment or 
act force or actions beyond did not cause a 
Permanent 
1 
height limitation and construct a 75-foot tall building; the County heard and ~~,, •. ~·~ the 
application November 15, 2007. 
18. Counterclaim Defendants have failed to comply with the condition the 
Agreement that required it to construct the Permanent Facility within eighteen (18) 
months. 
19. Counterclaim Defendants were aware of the height limitation of 45 feet in 
the M-1 zone when they attached Exhibit "C" Building Elevations - to the Agreement. 
\Vhen they attached Exhibit "C" - Building Elevations to the 
Agreement, Counterclaim Defendants were aware that in order to build a structure in 
excess allowed 45 foot height an application was required and approval had to be 
obtained via statutory notice and public hearings procedures. 
'11 
L, 1 . \ 1/b.en the;' attached ExI'ibit "C'~ Building __ ,_ to 
Agreement, Counterclaim Defendants were aware that a quasi-judicial officer must 
confine his or her decision to the record produced at the public hearing. 
The Agreement was made for the purpose of placing conditions on the 
zone and the Agreement did not address the 45 foot height limitation. 
23. Paragraph 5 of the Agreement, "Zoning Reversion Consent," gives 
County the written consent of Counterclaim Defendant to rezone the property upon 
of condition of the is only limited the 
§ 
25. Burns contested 11, to 
of Driggs Planning and Commission and letter April 17, 12 to 
County Board of Commissioners. Kirk Bums also spoke in opposition to the 
rezone application at 
April 11, 2012. 
Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission public hearing on 
26. In the minutes of the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission public 
hearing on April 11, 2012 Kirk Bums is documented as stating that he knew there would 
be a height issue from the beginning, but he wasn't sure of the extent until plans were 
developed. 
27. resubmitted its the to make a 
recommendation to rezone the Property and that application was heard on December 1 
2012. The Driggs Commission tabled the decision June l 13. 
28. By letter dated 4, 2013, Counsel requested that no action 
be taken on the rezone application until the court rules on the present lawsuit. 
29. Counterclaim Plaintiff, Teton County, performed all terms and conditions 
required to be performed by it under the Agreement. 
30. Counterclaim Defendants breached the Agreement by failing to: (a) 
comply with the County's revocation of authority for the Temporary Facility (Paragraph 
(b) consent to be rezoned (Paragraph 5 of the Agreement), (c) 
set forth 7 of Agreement); 
10 of the 
Counterclaim Plaintiff incorporates herein reference each and 
allegation and answer contained in the above paragraphs as well as Paragraphs 1 - 31 
this Counterclaim as though set forth at length. 
33. Counterclaim Plaintiff Teton County, Idaho is a political and corporate 
body of the State of Idaho and is entitled to 
Idaho Code§ 10-1213. 
a declaratory judgment pursuant to 
..,4 
.) ' . By letter dated April 17, 2012 to the Teton County Commissioners, and in 
response to an April 9, 2012 letter from the Teton County Commissioners, Counterclaim 
that" ... 'obligation to commence 
construction Facility within eighteen was 
excused majeure clause." 
35. force majeure is a contract clause that parties if an obligation 
cannot be performed due to causes that are outside the control the parties, causes 
could not be avoided through the exercise of due care. 
36. the zone change hearing on February 26, 2007, the Teton County 
Commissioners expressed concern that the Permanent Facility \vould be 45 feet high, and 
they were told that it would look similar in or substantially smaller than, the hangars 
at airport and that the high part of the structure would be approximately 40 feet tall. 
37. In entering the Agreement, Counterclaim 
limitation granted through a 
a 
risk that it 
Idaho Code § l l(d) a govermng to rezone 
property: 
over 
If a governing board adopts a zoning classification pursuant to a request by a 
property owner based upon a valid, existing comprehensive plan and zoning 
ordinance, the governing board shall not subsequently reverse its action or 
otherwise change the zoning classification of said property without the 
consent in writing of the current property owner for a period of four ( 4) years 
from the date the governing board adopted said individual property owner's 
request for a zoning classification change. If the governing body does reverse 
its action or otherwise change the zoning classification of said property 
during the above four (4) year period without the current property owner's 
consent in writing, current property owner shall have standing in a court 
of competent jurisdiction to enforce provisions of this section. 
Temporary 
(5) years is in excess the 
that has been 
permitted in 
on the subject property for 
M-1 zone. 
41. In accorda11ce ,:vith Paragraph 2(b)(\') of the De·veloper's 
purpose of the Temporary Facility was to "facilitate and support the construction of the 
Permanent Facility." 
42. Paragraph 5 of the Agreement, "Zoning Reversion Consent," states that 
the County may rezone the property, and provides that Counterclaim Defendants consent 
to a rezoning of their property, if Counterclaim Defendants fail to comply with 
conditions of the Agreement. 
Plaintiff is to obtain a declaration against 
the 
of the 
run, (d) 
lS and therefore it must 
Temporary Facility has been in violation of the Teton County zoning laws since March 1, 
2009. 
Attorney Fees 
44. If Teton County is the prevailing party it is entitled under Paragraph 12(e) 
Agreement to be awarded its attorneys fees and costs. 
Teton County is also entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 
1 and 121. 
Prayer 
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff prays for judgment as 
1 ,. 
2. For a decree establishing that the 18 month period to construct the 
Permanent Facility has not been tolled and that the 18 month period has expired; 
3. For a decree stating that the Agreement has not been breached by Teton 
County and that Bums' has no right to rescission; 
4. For a decree stating that if the Agreement is rescinded than the zone 
change from C-3 to M-1 would also be rescinded; 
5. For a that Teton County has the right, by agreement and 
6. 
this 
IDAHO 
additional 
of June, 2013. 
) 
) ss. 
) 
as 1s 
Tetnn f'rmnty being sworn, that she 
has read the the contents thereof and the ame are true to the best 
knowledge, information and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this [ l ~ay of June, 2013. Witness 
my hand and official seal. 
2nn-=-~~. Notary Public 
commission \ \- \ q - 13 
5 
correct 
or causing to be placed a 
prepaid, addressed to: 
Robert B. Bums 
Kimberly D. Evans 
thereof 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chartered 
P.O. Box 51505 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
a to 
United mail, 
[ X] U.S. Mail [ ] Hand [ ] Fax 
~L)(\ ~ 2_R1~~-
~1emon;;Iega1 Assistant 
6 
Drive Suite 
Office Box 51505 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone (208) 522-6700 
Facsimile (208) 522-5111 
rbb@moffatt.com 
kde@moffatt.com 
1 
Attorneys Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
vs. 
DISTRICT COURT OF 
OF 
CO'l\JCRETE, an 
and BlJRNS HOLDINGS, 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
TETON C01JNTY, a political subdivision of 
the of Idaho, 
Defenda11t/Counterclaimant. 
FOR 
165 
TO 
Counterdefendants Bums Concrete, Inc. and Bums Holdings, LLC Uointly, 
each and every averment contained in the Counterclaim filed 11, 13,in 
by Counterclaimant 
I 
averments in 
by admitted 111 no are true 
and conect 
2. Bums admits the avennents in paragraphs 2 through 6 the 
Counterclaim. 
3. Bums denies avennents in paragraph 7 of the Counterclaim, as 
Paragraph 
the 
Agreement 
of the Developer's Agreement 
Temporary Facility. 
required Bums "to erect 
4. Burns admits the averments in paragraphs 8 through 12 the 
5 response to 13 Bums 
Facility was to be completed pursuant to Paragraph 
eighteen (1 months from date execution of the 
reason the application the "subject 111 
paragraph. 
6. In response to paragraph 14 of the Counterclaim, Burns admits 
substance of averment, notwithstanding minor errors in the purported quotation. 
31, 
'7 
I. Burns denies avennents in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Counterclaim. 
8. Burns admits the avennents in paragraph 17 of Counterclaim. 
9. avennent in paragraph 8 of the Counterclaim. 
-2 
U. to 9 it 
to 21 
to the 
averment states a conclusion of law to no response is required. 
12. 
13. 
Bums denies the avennents in paragraphs and 
Bums admits the avennents in paragraphs 24 through 
Counterclaim. 
of the 
Counterclaim. 
14. Burns denies the avennents in 
Counterclaim. 
COUNT 
15. 
1 1 
] 6. Burns admits ave1111ents in 
17. response to paragraph 
statement 
the controlling terms of the "subject 
Developer's Agreement 
18. response to paragraph 35 
29 through 31 of the 
of Counterclaim. 
Counterclaim, Burns admits the 
letter sets or 
Burns admits a force 
rnajenre clause protects a party to a contract if an obligation cannot be perfonned to causes 
that are specified within scope of the particular clause, as in the particular 
from . . action beyond Developer's · control." 
1 . to 
2L to 
averment states a conclusion of law to which no response is required. 
In response to paragraph 39 of the Counterclaim, Bums admits that the 
provision accurately states Idaho Code§ 67-651 l(d). 
2..., .) . Bums admits the averments in paragrapb 40 the Counterclaim, but 
any height limitation applies to the Temporary Facility, which 
not a building or fixture. 
24. In response to paragraph 41 the Counterclaim, Bums 
two purposes in Paragraph 
defined Permanent 
being allow the Developer , Burns] to 
25. In response to paragraph of the Counterclaim, Bums denies 
sets 
and 
that one of 
admits that the paragraph applies if, and subject to, Bums' unexcused failure to comply with 
any of the conditions of the agreement. 
26. denies avem1ents in paragraphs 43 45 the 
Counterclaim. 
AFFIRlVIATIVE DEFENSES 
Counterclaim fails to state a claim can granted. 
are to 011 
to lS 1 of the 
s Agreement to be reasonable costs. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Bums prays for judgment on the Counterclaim as follows: 
1. for judgment the be dismissed and Teton 
nothmg thereby; 
2. for an of all costs and including reasonable attorney 
as just 
13. 
& 
( ) Hand 
( ) Overnight 
( ) Facsimile 
-Telephone: 
Facsimile: 208.522.5111 
kde@moffatt.com 
19449.0005 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of 
the State of Idaho, 
Defendant/Counterclaima.11t. 
Case No. CV-201 165 
Plaintiffs Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC Gointly, "Burns") hereby move 
to Rule 56(a) and (c), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for the entry of summary 
judgment in Burns' favor on the liability components only of Counts I - III of the Verified 
Complaint for: (i) Declaratory Judgment, (ii) Breach Contract and Rescission, (iii) Unjust 
~,~u~,,,.,.,.,., filed May 21, 2013 (the "Verified Complaint"), against Defendant County, 
and 
(ii) 
fiied June 11, 
to 
13, and (iv) the affidavit 
undersigned counsel being filed concurrently herewith. 
DATED this 8th day of August 2014. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK& FIELDS, 
CHARTERED 
By 
to be served by the method indicated and addressed to the following: 
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
89 N. Main St., Suite 5 
Driggs, ID 83422 
(208) 354.2994 
( ) Mail, Postage Prepaid 
I~\Hand Delivered 
NJ)vemight Mail 
· ( ) Facsimile 
- 3 
-Facsimile: 208.522.5111 
kde@moffatt.com 
19449.0005 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of 
the State ofldaho, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV-201 165 
EVANS ROSS 
I, KIMBERLY D. EVANS ROSS, being duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as 
follows: 
1. I am counsel of record for Plaintiffs Bums Concrete, Inc. and Bums Holdings, 
judgment, which is acknowledged by 
partial 
County its discovery responses to 
as having been sent by Teton County. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit Fis a true and correct copy of the letter referenced in 
paragraph 28 of the Statement of Facts included in Bums' supporting memorandum for partial 
summary judgment, which letter is acknowledged by Teton County in its discovery responses to 
as having been received by Teton County. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of the letter referenced in 
29 of the Statement of Facts included in Bums' supporting memorandum for partial 
judgment, which is acknowledged by Teton County in discovery responses to 
as been sent by County. 
5. i1;tttached the letter referenced in 
30 of the Statement of Facts include Bums' supporting memorandum for partial 
summarJ judgment, which letter is acknowledged by Teton County in its discovery responses to 
as having been sent by Teton County. 
to of 
Residing at="""-'~'---'-=-=-
My Commission Expires 
method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Kathy ""'''0..,,"'r 
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
89 N. Main St., Suite 5 
Driggs, ID 83422 
(208) 354.2994 
to by 
1 ) U S M,;\1·1 PoQt,;icre PrPpairl 
\ • > L~ L' L U -t:, L - L~ ( J Hand Delivered 
,,JQ Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Kirk Butn.s 
Bums Concrete, Inc. 
2385 Gallatin A venue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
October 4, 2012 
Dear Mr. Burns: 
Board of County Commissioners 
On April 9, 2012 the Coooty s.ent you a written request to remove your "Temporary 
Facility" by July 1, 2012. Nothing has been done to rem ove the facility as oft.he date of the 
present letter. fn accordance with Paragraph 2(b )(vi) of the Development Agreement for Burns 
Hoiding, LLC filed in Teton County as Instrument#.191250 on September 5, 2007, the County 
has revoked Burns Holding's authority to operate their "Temporary Facility.'' Please commence 
removal activity immediately. · 
Kathryn Rinaldi, Chair 
Teton County Board of C ounty Commissioners 
EXHIBIT E 
A. Peterman 
Mark$. Prusynski 
Stephen R. Thomas 
Glenna M. G-irisce:n::;en 
Gcrud T. Husch 
Scott L Caropbdl 
Roben; B. Burns 
J\.fid,acl E. Thomas 
Pau!cia :M:. Olsson 
David S. Jensen 
Junes L. Marrin 
C. Oayton Gill 
Michad W. McGreaham 
David P. G-.udner 
Julian E. G-abiola 
·Kirnbedy D. Evans Ross 
Jon A. Srenquisc 
Muk C. Peterson 
Tyler]. Anderson 
J.,ndrew J. Walder, 
Dylan B. L.wre-nce: 
Ritchie 
G.Hillen 
Marthew J. McGee 
Mindy M. Willman 
Andrea]. Rosholt 
Jetta H>rdi Mathews 
Robecc E. Bakes, of counsel 
Norman M. Semankot of counsel 
Willis C Molli,.tc, 1907-1980 
Eugentc C Thomas, 1931-20 l 0 
John W Ba.m:cr, 1931-2011 
Kirk R. Hdviec, 1956-2003 
Teton County Board of County Commissioners 
Teton County Courthouse 
150 Courthouse Drive 
Driggs, ID 83422 
October 1 2012 
via Certified Mail 
and US. Mail 
Boise 
Idaho Falls 
Pocatello 
-0829 
Physical Address 
US Bank Plaza 
101 S Capitol Blvd 10th Fl 
Boise ID 83702-7710 
208 345 2000 
800422 2889 
208 385 5384 fax 
wwtJ.moffatl.com 
Re: Burns Holdings, LLC/Y our Notice of Revocation Dated October 4, 2012 -Notice of 
Default 
MTBR&FFile No. 19449.5 
Dear Commissioners: 
By your notice of October 2012, to Concrete, Inc. (which is an affiliate of Burns 
Holdings, LLC ("Bums Holdings") and is jointly referred to with Holdings in this letter 
as the "Developer") you provided notice of the revocation of the Developer's authority to 
a concrete manufacturing facility located in Teton Peaks \lie\cv Subdivision (the 
"Temporary Facility'). The cited authority for your notice was Paragraph 2(b )(vi) of the 
Developer's Agreement for Bums Holdings, LLC (the "Agreement"), which was recorded in 
Teton County (the "County') on September 5, 2007, as Instrument No. 191250. For the 
reasons set forth below, your notice constitutes a breach of the Agreement. Accordingly, in 
accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 8 of the Agreement, the Developer hereby 
provides the County with the Notice of Default required by the terms of the Agreement. 
This Notice of Default is based on the followmg facts and legal authority: 
1. The terms of the Agreement were negotiated by and between the Developer and 
representatives of both the County and the City of Driggs .. 
2. Paragraph 2.b(iii) and Exhibit C of the Agreement provide for the Developer's 
constrnction of its desired 75 foot building (the "Permanent Facility"). 
3. fo accordance with 
Commission heard on 
requirements, the City Driggs' Planning and Zoning 
11, 2007, and unanimously recommended for approval by 
F CITent:2611010.1 
County bot.h the Agreement the issuance of a conditional use permit allovving 
the 75 foot height of the Permanent Facility (the "CUP"). 
4. Thereafter, on or about August 31, 2007, the County and the Developer entered into the 
Agreement and the County caused the Agreement to be recorded. 
5. Following the execution of the Agreement, the Developer expended many hundreds of 
thousands of dollars constructing and implementing the commitments imposed under 
the Agreement, including erecting and operating the Temporary Facility required under 
Paragraph 2.b(v) of the Agreement and constructing the road and highway 
improvements required under Paragraph 2.d(iv) of the Agreement. 
6. After the Developer had incurred the foregoing costs as required by the Agreement, and 
notwithstanding the unanimous reconunendation for approval by the City of Driggs' 
Planning and Zoning Commission and the determination of the County's attorney that 
the Agreement was a valid and binding contract, the Teton County Board of County 
Commissioners (the "Commission") voted to deny the CUP on November 15, 2007. 
7. The Developer confirmed with the County's director of planning and zoning, Kurt 
on 2007, that the County would not issue building permit 
the construction oft.he 75 foot Permai,ent Facility specified in the Agreement. 
8. The Developer has since that time undertaken every act reasonably possible to obtain 
the permits and variance required by the County for the Developer to construct the 
Perrrnmerit Facility, which permits and variance the County has refused to issue and has 
worked to frustrate at each and every step. 
9. The Developer cam1ot now construct the Permanent Facility without an amendment to 
the ordinances of the County, over which amendment the Developer has no control. 
10. Section 2.b(iv) of the Agreement provides, in relevant part: "The installation of the 
Permanent Facility shall be completed within eighteen (18) months of execution of this 
Agreement by the County subject to delays ... any ~ther act 
majeure or action beyond Developer's control." 
11 The term "force majeure" means: "An event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor 
controlled." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 718 (9th ed. 2009). 
12. Thus, because the cannot now and has not ever been able to construct the 
Permanent Facility by reason of events and actions by 
no 1 
Ciient2611070.1 
13. The County's reliance on Paragraph 2.b(vi) of the ("In the event the 
Permanent Facility is not completed within the time allowed herein... fails to give 
effect to the tolling of the 18-monthperiod specified in Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the 
Agreement by the force-majeure clause contained in that same paragraph which 
tolling the County has implicitly acl'11owledged for the last several years by not earlier 
seeking to stop the operation of the Temporary Facility. 
14. Moreover, the following legal principles would proscribe the County's revocation of the 
Developer's authority to operate the Temporary Facility even in the absence of the 
application of the force-majeure clause contained in the Agreement: 
A condition precedent is an event nor certain to. occur, but 
which must occur, before performance u11der a contract becomes 
due. Steiner v. Ziegler Tamura Ltd., Co., 138 Idaho 238, 61 
P.3d 595,599 (2002}(citing World.Wide Lease, Inc. v. 
Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880,887,728 P.2d 769,776 
(Ct.App.1986)). A condition precedent may be expressed in the 
parties' agreement. Id. When there is a failure 0f a 
precedent through no fault of the parties, no liability or duty to 
perfom1 anses under the contract. Id. \Vhere a is the cause 
of the failure of a condition precedent, he cannot take advantage 
of the failure. Fish v. Fleishman, 87 Idaho 126, 133, 391 P.2d 
344, 348 (1964) ( citing 3A COF.BIN ON CONTF_A.CTS, § 767 (1960) 
COne who uajustly prevents the performance or the happening of 
a condition of his own promissory duty thereby eliminates it as 
such a condition. He will not be pennitted to take advantage of 
his own wrong, and to escape from liability for not rendering his 
promised performance by preventing the happening of the 
condition on which it was promised.")). 
Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Tmst, 141 Idaho 123, 128 (2005). 
15. Accordingly, both by application ofthe force-majeure clause contained in the 
Agreement and the legal principles articulated in Dengler, the Developer is now and has 
always been in full compliance with the obligations imposed by the Agreement. 
Based on the foregoing facts and legal authorities, demand is hereby made as follows: 
County contends the Developer has breached or is m default of the Agreement, 
that the provide the Developer with "not less than thirty (30) days Notice of 
nature 
Clicnt:261107D.1 
/ 
(ii) 
the manner and period during which said default may be 
satisfactorily cured" accordance with the requirements imposed under Paragraph 8 
of the Agreement; 
That the County take no further action adverse to the Developer's rights under the 
Agreement without first providing a written Notice of Default and opportunity to cure 
the alleged default as is expressly required by Paragraph 8 of the Agreement~ and 
(iii) That the County provide the Developer with a vmtten retraction of its notice of 
revocation dated October 4, 2012, within 30 days of the County's receipt of this letter 
which demand is hereby made subject to the Developer's reservation of rights to treat 
any further action by the County that is adverse to the Developer's under the 
Agreement or the County's failure to retract its notice of revocation within said 30 days 
as a repudiation of the County's obligations Turider the Agreement 
No notice or demand will be made before suit is filed to recover aJl damages incurred by 
together with my client's reasonable attorney fees and costs to Paragraph 
RBB/bjl/kdp 
cc: Kirk Burns (via E-mail) 
Linda Szimhardt (via E-mai[) 
Dale W. Storer, Esq. (via E-mail) 
Kimberly Evans Ross, Esq. (via E-mail) 
Client:2611070_ 1 
To: ·1pc City of Driggs 
From: Teton CQuncy 
¥-ath.y Spil:z:et, Pr~fulg .. Mtcincy 
1'cirut Cotmly Coo:rlnonoo 
89 N. Slroer;. Sh?.. 6, DrlSWJ, ID 8M22 
(2(lB) 354-im pm= 
(:z®}SSHm 
kspltzer~ko. letan.id.U$ 
Re.: Request for a public headng in front of the Drlw' Planning nnd Zonirrg Comrnissioa for 
the concfiJiOfllll wrung designation ofM~l to revert buck to C-3 due 10 the pnrccl. O\\ner's fallo.ro 
an.d i.oahll:ity to comply wifhihe condiuonS of the te-zone.. 
Dme: October 231 1012 
On Feb~cy 26, 2001 Bums Holdii:ig:; U.C (lhe "Dcvcl.oJ.)CJ:") obtah)«f n. CQnditiomd zone 
cliruig.e :frotn. C-3 to M-1 In order to opei:ate a co~e batch pfanL On August 3 P', 2.007 TelM 
County nud. ilii:.. Dcvclo~entcro:1 into aDcvdopvrs Agrc¢;lJicilt (the "~tli'J One of the 
conditions of tlte Agteemon:t ·wus that bm Developer construct a 75 foot f:li11 building as depk:ti;d 
faExhfuit C oftbc.Agrt;ement. N the rei-wne bearings t!ie Dc,;clopci: rcpc-atcdl:y promis:cl M 
cru:Iosoo, modern. batch pf ant tbat would emit little to 110 -dust or no~ To that end the 
Ag.rt~nent SU.U::~ that the bntth P.'a."1 will be. entirely enc!~ within Ii building. ref~ 
fultlbit: C-which shows ihe building devution of 15 feet Turoug}wcl the Bunts Holrflllg vs. 
Te/_-0n. Cotatry lawsuit, the Developer stated fuata building hcigW. of 15. teet Wrtll ·iiecessacy to 
mlligatc !loond, dust, and 'libnrtlon as well as to opemtec in nn cn:crgy cifiokot tuannet:. · The 
Dwcilopers a:ttorney stated lb.at if the buikling hci.ght Wero limi~ thml the concrete batcli plnnt 
would ''not be abk to cipci:ate in ml.~ ,iffiM~ot ~ @d wq.mo rwuire extended opcrnthig 
hours:in ordtttomcet local deml'U1.ds for con=te.. Int.he absence of such equipment, ~plant 
would be nble to operate Mly as a U.'MSJX)J:t µbmt whfoh would have in~ noise mid dust 
e.mana.tmg; from the sifo •• ,. Such sc\lMdo muJ.d 1mw increused truck riolse, vibtn1fon and 
copgestion. au fill ah:ead~· crowded State lligbwny 33 ootrldor ." Appdl41Tt's Brief~ 6-1 ( dting 
CUP-Tr. Vql II, p, 10, LL 1-2.S). I)cyclopot alsq smtes fuat without a 75 foot height there wuuld 
bo !llQl"O tro:& exhaust em:lssi-Olls l=ausc ooncrete-would have to llili:ed in indMaual 1,.~ 
Appi!lfr;nt'.r Brlef p, 1 (citing CUP-Tr, Vol II. p. H. LL 14-24~ llb vccyilkar from the 
transcriptof fuc zone change hearings arld in the Developer's Agreement that the only reason for 
the zone clwige '.Vas to a:llmv op=tion of a coru::tcici batch plmit thal would ~.I® fi\,00 of (h~ 
hm::rnful cff~. If thes,:; ~ effects wuld .oot bt;. l"lllCiYlnkd th® fue Z(}11(} dl,mge vlould 'not 
have been gnrnted.. 
Although the Developer \Vas gµmted a condlti&rutl .rc:zone ta M-11 a zone in which a ooncrete 
plant ls a permitted use, in onlerto coostnrctthcir proposed 1S foot tall p!Mlthoyrequircd. a 
CUP. Wit'buw: !he CUP the Developer could noi constro« the specific batch plllllt that was 
pro.robed in ardc:r to obtain the ronc change. 
Oo N-Ovei:nhet'. 15, 2007 the Teto!1 Cotmty 11o:i.rd of ConttnitSionea dcmied Appellant's 
oonditional use peun1t appli~tioa an<! thus Dcv¢lopec was unab!c fo build a batch pll!nt who sc 
height exceeded 45 foci. On Jxx:etnbet 11, 2007 lh$ Develop~ filed forj udicM review of the 
County's decision to &:ny the CUI'!-. T.bid lfl>~uit mncludi:;di:n Janlilll}' of20l2 w:ith a Supreme 
Court dcd:tion thnt upheld the County's decision to deny the CUP. The Saprenu, Co\Ut also 
stated 1ha4 based upon current law, the Devclppcr would have (o obtain II VIT!lM<;e to exceed 1,he 
bcight limitation in tbe Driggs' Area ofimpa:ct 
EXHIBIT G 
oSq 
Am ate ln th$ in a~e 
with Idaho Code 61-65I I.A. !hat Driggs De.~s parocl revert: 
oocl:: to (l Cl zone.. Idaho Cooe 67-651 lA ~res that a &vclopment a:~ may be 
term~ted and a zacing drngn.afion ~ ulhc ft:<ttll1"ctrtei'lts in ibe:A~ are .!lO( mcl 
wtihlti a ~abfo fune or tlp!ln too fuilure of the o\VI!cr of the p~ to C®1_Ply with the 
oondllions in~ agreemeAf. At the bearltlg b¢tbre the Drlgg;,; • Planning md Zoning 
CofllliUSsion, t11e Developer rutcd that bo ~l ~ to ~ly with~ 75 f\Xlt hclght 
condition by applying for 1r .~. ·11» Cwnty tberefure wifudrcw its appiicauo:n: Co revert 
=rung~ tile outcome of thi:: Dc:vcl~ vnri1moe application. DritJSS' Planning ond 
Zonlttg Commission ~nded denilil of the Deveklpets v~rlance ~ and the Boord of 
Cotm!J (;orumfzslllnetS denied the variance applicauon Cin Scptanher 13, 10 J:1. No judicial 
tcvicw of ili1s decision was~ and tl:-c 28 day time .frmr.¢ for this .:i\XjW:$t to be made to 
Distdct Court Ms p,I\SSed. Thus, the varlance dcnlal is a fimtl ru1<l unreviewable decision. 
Bee.ause ilie.te is no legal means ctitt~tfy aVl'!ilab!e i:o th~ Th,\'i,lcl:apcr to build the promised batch I 
plant;~ Cotlttly ha:reby ~hrttlis ibi applletition. fo revert !he zo11lng o:fthe De:vclopc:r'z parcel 
btid: to C...3 !ti. ~re with Trfohcr Code 67-651 IA 
2 
November 5, 2012 
Robert Bums 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83 70 l 
Dear Mr. Bums: 
Kathy Spitzer, Prosecuting Attorney 
Teton County Courthouse 
89 N. Street, Ste. S, Driggs, ID 83422 
(208) 354-2990 phone 
(208) 354-2994 
kspitzer@co .te ton.id.us 
RECEIVED 
NOV O 7 2012 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT. 
ROCK & FIELDS. CHTD 
Thank you for your letter dated October 15, 20~12. Your letter alleges two reasons why the 
authority to operate the temporary facility cannot be revoked: 1) the force majeure clause in the 
Developer's Agreement; and 2) that the building of the permanent faci lity is a condition 
precedent to the revocation of authority to operate the temporary facility. I respectfully disagree 
with both reasons. 
First, there can be no event of force majeure if the event could have been anticipated. 
'The developer was on notice of the applicable zoning laws that restricted the building's height to 
45 feet unless a CUP was granted . . Force_ rnajeure claus_es do not .?9Yer government regulation . 
suc_h as ZOQin.gJaws., f::tirthen:nore; the for<:frnaj,~ure cl~ujfi _i~ n'cifreleva'nttb t}ie temporary . 
fiidHty; it -relat~s ;nly)o the trrn{liinitati6n roj'.26mp,Jy_t1on\l the pernianeht'f a_2ifily?fBei 'fo~ce 
rnajew:e cl~l:!Se;is,lnappl1cable to !~fpiesent sitllatiqn.' , . .· < . ,.· ' I •' ' ' • C ' . • , 
Second, Paragraph 2(b )(v f oFtlte Dev6JSper 's Agreernent statei thafthe'purpose' of the ' 
Temporary Facility is to '.'facilitate and ·s\lpport the construction of the Permanent Facil ity/' The 
temporary facil ity was not a condition precedent to an event, but an accommodation. Because the 
Developer is prohibited from building the Permanent Facility, there is no longer a need to 
"facilitate and support" its construction. Paragraph 2(b)(iv) of the Agreement states that 
construction of the Permanent Facility shall commence immediately upon execution of the 
Agreement. Construction of the Permanent Facility could not be commenced immediately 
because the height limit in the area was 45 feet At the time of signing the Agreement the 
Developer knew he had to obtain a CUP or a variance, and in fact had applied for a CUP in June 
of 2007. No one knew whether the Developer would be granted the CUP until the BOCC made 
their decision on November. Thus, at the time of signing the Agreement the Developer knew he 
could not perform. 
Throughout your letter you blame the County for your client's predicament. The case law you 
cite regarding conditions precedent involve wrongdoing and fault on the party enforcing 
performance. By law, the permits sought by the Developer were uncertain - the County did not, 
as you state in Paragraph 8 of your letter, work to frustrate their approval. During the zone 
change hearings the Developer faikd to mention that a 75 foot tall building would be necessary 
to construcLthe repres~'nted facility·. The 75 footheigl;it was depicted in an exhibit to the August 
2007 Development Agreement, but a 75 foot heighfwas riot mentioned in any public bearing' 
(until the CUP application hearings)' and could not have been approved viithout a public hearing 
EXHIBIT H 
o lo I 
must 
Concrete to remove 
first notice was provided on April 9, 2012. Paragraph 8 of the Uf',LvvLUviH 
and period oftime to cure need only be supplied "where appropriate." You admit in your letter 
that the Developer has no means by which to comply with its promises. The Developer cannot 
cure its default and thus a manner and period of time to cure need not be supplied. Nonetheless, 
the April 9th letter did give deadlines for removal of the facility, deadlines that the Developer 
ignored. The County again sent a request to remove the Tempora1y Facility to your client on 
October 4, 2012, and that request has been iisnored. Our next request will be made in Court. 
Sins;.erely, 
/a~;;;~ 
Kathy Spitzer 
cc. Board of County Commissioners, Teton County 
date: 8/21/20 
Time: 8:38 am 
Judge: Dane Watkins Jr 
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen 
Kimberly Evans Ross, Plaintiffs Counsel 
Kathy Spitzer, Defendant's Counsel 
J calls case; ids those present 
not being 
objection 
a concrete plant on 
PA - Land use regulations 
Long process to get temporary batch 
\!\/ant Permanent batch 
Long drawn out relationship 
Appeal to SC 
to figure out what contract is 
DA development agreement for a zone change to allow build 
After zone cha~ge wanted to build something feet higher which was 30 'higher than 
will be - be dispositive 
- SJ will be pivotal 
J - when filed May 21, 2013 
J - how long would DA like 
DA two weeks would be great 
J going to suggest 45 days 
- would like to get moving 
month plenty time 
J will allow month to 
weeks 
J - will do in Teton 
DA 
J - November 20 in Teton County 10:00 
J will file in Teton County, shoot me a copy 
Clerk will send notice 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., 
an Idaho corporation, and 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
V. 
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision 
the State ofldaho, 
Defendant/Counterclaim ant. 
m 
Case No. CV-13-165 
J\10TION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
of Procedure, moves the Court for entry of summary judgment in Teton County's 
favor. The basis and grounds summary are explained in the attached 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court enter sumrnary 
judgment in Teton County's favor on Counts I and II ofDefendant/Counterclaimant's 
Counterclaim and that the Court award Defendants attorney fees and costs in this matter 
and for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
Dated this 1 st11 dav of September 
., ~ 
4 was 
Honorable Dane Watkins )8 U.S. Mail Bonneville County Courthouse Hand Delivered 
605 North Capital D Overnight Mail 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 D Facsimile 
D E-mail 
Kimberly D. Evans Ross :a U.S. Mail AJtorney at Law Hand Delivered 
1120 East 1275 North D Overnight Mail 
Shelley, ID 83274 D Facsimile 
D E-mail 
Defendant Teton 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., AN IDAHO 
CORPORATION, AND BURNS HOLDINGS, 
LLC, AN IDAHO LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
V. 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
County of Teton ) 
COUNTY 
CaseNo. CV-13-165 
AFFIDAVIT OF KATHY SPITZER 
I, KATHY SPITZER, being duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am counsel of record for Defendant, Teton County in the above-entitled 
action and make factual statements set forth below based on my own personal 
knowledge. 
3. Attached 
Brief filed with 
E is a true and correct copy pages 6 7 I 
Idaho Supreme Court on Case Docket 
38269-2010, and referenced on pages 17 & 18 of Teton County's Supporting 
Memorandum for summary judgment. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of pages 2 & 3 of 
Appellant's Reply Brief filed with the Idaho Supreme Court on Case No. CV-07-376, 
Docket No. 38269-2010, and referenced on page 17 of Teton County's Supporting 
Memorandum summary judgment. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit is a true and correct copy the letter 
referenced on page 19 County's supporting memorandum for 
judgment. 
6. hereto as of the letter 
referenced on Page 20 of Teton County's supporting memorandum for summary 
judgment. 
DATED this Jf_tay of September, 2014. 
JAN CLEMONS 
Notary Public 
State of Idaho 
Residing at: Idaho 
Commission Expires: 11/1 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY that on of September, 2014 the foregoing was 
filed, served, or copied as follows: 
DOCUMENT FILED: 
Honorable Dane Watkins 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 North Capital 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Kimberly 
Attorney at Law 
1120 East 1275 North 
Shelley, ID 83274 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
E-mail 
S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
E-mail 
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·-•·,E -11rv1 :~OUP~ BURNS HOLDING, LLC CUP DENIAL TET0!'1GO.IDD1STRIGt ,t 
ltMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAVI 
The following are amended findings of fact and conclµsions of law for the denial 
of the Bums Holdings, LLC's Conditional Use Permit application by the Board of 
County Commissioners of Teton County on November 15, 2007. iul references to the 
Driggs City Ordinances refer to the January 16, 2007 version. 
1. Conclusion of Law 
Bums Holding, LLC must apply fo r a variance to exceed the 45 foot height limitation in 
the M-1 zone. Idaho Code§ 67-6516 clearly states that: "[a] variance is a modification 
of the bulk and placement requirements of the ordinance as to . . . height of buildings, or 
other ordinance provision affecting the size or shape of a structure." The applicant 
requests a modification of the height of a building and therefore must apply for a variance 
and not a conditional use permit. The Idaho Constitution, fu'iicle XIl, § 2, provides, "Any 
county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such 
local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with 
the general laws." "A local ordinance that conflicts with a state law or is preempted by 
state regulation of the subj ect matter, is void." Arthur v. Sh oshone County, 133 Idaho 
854,862,993 P.2d 617, 625 (Idaho App.2000); citing Envirosafe Serv. of Idaho v. 
County of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998, 1000 (1987). Because the County 
cannot act in conflict with State law it reads any ambiguity in the Driggs Ordinance in 
ha..TID.ony with the Local Land Use Pla.nning Act. 
Finding of Fact 
Chapter 2, Section 13 C of the City ofDriggs' Ordinance 281-07 states that " [a]ny 
building or structure or portion thereof hereafter erected shall not exceed forty-five ( 45) 
feet in height unless approved by conditional use p ermit." (Emphasis added.) The 
Countyit1terprets this section of the ordinance as follows: "[a]nybuilding or structure or 
portion thereof hereafter erected shall not exceed forty-five ( 45) feet in height." Any 
other reading ofthis section of the Driggs City Ordinance would directly conflict with § 
67-6516 of the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUP A") which clearly states that a 
variance and not a conditional use permit must be obtained before one can modify the 
height of a building. That portion of the Driggs ordinance that could be interpreted so as 
to conflict with State law is void, of no effect, as if it had never existed. The County finds 
that the applicant did not make the correct application for a height variance and that it is 
not possible for the County to grant a ClJP to Bums Holding, LLC in order to allow them 
to build a structure which is 30 feet higher than_ the maximum height allowed in the M-1 
zone. A conditional use permit is much easier to obtain than a variance. The applicant 
cannot get around a very clear area of State law by applying for a CUP, even when the 
Driggs code uses the term "conditional use permit", when State law is clear that a 
va,....-jance is required. 
References to the need for a "variance" occurred at least twenty times du.ring the 
November 15 , 2007 hearing. Some of Chairman Young's first words were: "This is a 
conditional use permit hearing for a height variance." 4: 17-18. The first time the 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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I applicant :himself spealcs he states that he is requesting a height variance. 9: 15-16. Sandy Mason, representing Valley Advocates for Responsible Development stated: "V ARD 
does not recommend granting a ClJP for this height variance for several reasons ." The 
applicant' s attorney, Dale Storer, a renowned local government, planning and zoning 
attorney, 1 was present during the bearing and has represented tti:e applicant during the 
entire process. Iv.l:r. Storer failed to clarify the situation or give reasons in the applicant' s 
response why a CUP was the correct method for a height variance when the Idaho Code 
is ciear t.hat a variance is required for an increased height. Regardless, the County does 
not feel that the applicant was unaware or uninformed of the law. 2 
2. Condusion of Law 
Idaho Code§ 67-6512(a) states 
A special use permit may be granted to an applicant if the proposed use is 
conditionally permitted by the terms of the ordinance, subject to conditions 
pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance, subject to the ability of 
political subdivisions, including school districts, to provide services for the 
proposed use, and when it is not in conflict with the plan. 
Section 2 of the City of Driggs' Orclirnu1ce 274-07 also addresses conditional use permit 
procedures, offering criteria similar to the above and adding that there must be conditions 
imposed upon the use that assure protection and compatibility with the surrounding 
properties, uses and neighborhood. An applicant must meet all five of these tests in order 
to be granted a C(JP. A finding that an applicant does not meet one of the five criteria is 
sufficient to deny an application. Even if the County were to analyze the application 
according to the rules governing a conditional use permit, Burns Holding failed to meet 
four of the five of the necessary criteria for approval. 
Finding of Fact. 
A. The CUP could not be .granted because a height of 75 feet is not 
conditionally permitted by the specific terms of the ordinance. 
The Driggs M-1 zoning ordinance lists two categories of uses for the M-1 zone, 
allowed and conditional. Allowed uses are listed under Chapter 2, Section 13(A) .and 
Section 13(B) lists the ten (10) "Conditional Uses Permitted". A height of 75 feet is not 
1 Excerpt from firm bio: Mr. Storer has served as the City Attorney for the City ofidaho Falls since 1982 
and he also represents a number of other smaller cities, school districts, counties, electrical utilities and 
private developers. He has served three terms as president of the Idaho Municipal Attorneys Association 
and he currently serves on the board of directors for the Idaho Municipal Attorneys Association and as the 
Idaho state chairman of the International Municipal Lawyers Association. He has frequently testified 
before the Idaho State L egislature on a variety of issues affecting cities, counties and other public entities. 
2 In the County's initial brief on judicial review of the CUP denial it states: "What is significant about 
Petitioner's Cl JP application is that it was not looking to modify the zoning of the site, but rather to modif; 
the allowable height of the building on the site. " Respondents B1ief, August 5, 2008, page 9. 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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are mentioned in Section 1 ordinance states: 
or structure or portion thereofherea..fter erected shall not exceed forty-five ( 45) 
unless approved by conditional use permit." County does not believe this 
overrides the specific provisions of Section 13(B) of fae ordina..TJ.ce. If Section 
13(C) were interpreted as conditionally permitting a 75 foot high structure then 
ordinai1.ce would have to be interpreted as conditionaily permitting a building of 
height and size, skyscrapers included. An ordinance provision cannot be read in isolation 
but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document. Chapter l(D) ofDrigg's 
City Ordinance 274-07 states as its intent "that this Ordinance be· and 
construed to further the purposes of this Ordinance a..11d the objectives and characteristics 
of the districts." The stated purpose of the Ordinance is to: 
[P]romote pride ownership, health, safety, comfort, convenience and general 
welfare of the residents of the City ofDnggs and to achieve the following 
objectives: 
1. To protect property rights and enhance property values. 
2. To provide for protection and enhancement of the local economy. 
3. To ensure that important environmental features are protected and 
enhanced. 
4. To encourage protection of prime agricultural lands for the 
production of food. 
To concentration of population and overcrowding of la..Ttd. 
To ensure that the development ofland is commensurate with the 
physical characteristics of the land. 
7 * To protect life and property' areas subject to 
disasters. 
8. To protect recreation resources. 
9. To avoid undue water and air pollution. 
hazards and 
10. To secure safety from fire and provide adequate open spaces for light 
and air. 
11. To implement the comprehensive plan. 
12. To provide the manner and form of preparing and processing 
applications for modification of and variances from zoning regulations; 
13. To encourage the proper distribution and compatible integration of 
commercial and industrial uses within designated areas; and 
14. To insure that additions and alterations to, and/or remodeling of, 
existing buildings or structures are completed in compliance with the 
restrictions and limitations imposed thereunder. 
Chapter l(C) of Ordinance 274-07. 
structures to far exceed allowable limitations by a conditional 
use permit is not in keeping with the purpose and mtent of the Ordinance and thus the 
cannot be read as to 
Law 
economy in area are 
Having a "sky' s th~ limit" ordinance that could essentially block 
not protect this economy; to ensure important 
are protected and enhanced because our vistas are one of our area's 
rmportant environmental assets; 4) fail to ensure that development of land is 
commensurate with the physical characteristics of the land because such an interpretation 
not take physical characteristics of the land into account; 5) fail to protect recreation 
resources and fail to provide adequate open spaces for light and air because these cannot 
provided without a height limitation, views and a of openness being an · 
of much of the Valley's recreation; 6) fail to implement the comprehensive plan as 
explained in paragraph D below; 7) fail to provide the manner and form of preparing 
processing applications modification ai-id variances from zoning regulations 
because it would provide confusion in their processing; and 8) fail to provide for the 
compatible integration of commercial and industrial uses within designated areas 
it is impossible to assure compatibility without some form of height limitation. 
Furthermore, County cannot reconcile an application for a conditional use 
pennit for foot high structure with the clear meaning of Chapter Section 3(A) of the 
Ordinai."1.ce. Section 3 is very similar to Idaho § 67-6516, and states: 
vaiiance is a modification of the requirements ordinance as to 
... height of buildings, size of lots, or other ordinance 
affecting fae size or shape of a structure or 
of the structure upon the lot. does not include a change 
aufaorized land use. 
Vlhen the County City Ordinance 27 4-07 as a whole it is clear that a 
CUP can only be obtained in an M-1 zone for fae uses listed in Chapter 2, Section 13(B) 
and that a height of 7 5 feet is not amongst those uses. The statement in Chapter 2, 
Section 13(C) that a building or structure may allowed to exceed forty-five (45) m 
height cannot be read jn isolation. Additionally, because there are no parameters around 
this height allowance, the County cannot say that a seventy five foot high structure is 
specifically permitted by the terms of the ordinance. Furthermore, as is explained in the 
next section, a CUP can only be granted subject to conditions pursuant to specific 
provisions of the ordinance. There are no specific provisions listed in Chapter 2, Section 
13(C) that suggest how a height modification can be conditioned. 
B. The CUP could not be granted pursuant to specific conditions listed in the 
Code§ 67-6512(a) also requires faat a CUP not be granted unless it will be 
"subject to conditions to specific of the ordinance." There are no 
rei;rnr.:11n2: the conditioning of 30 foot height modification in the 
ordinance conditional use states: 
.,....,..,..,-n,-.C',,rt conditional use cannot meet conditions necessary to 
development is maintained properly; 
e. Designating exact location nature of development; 
f Requiring provision for on-site facilities or services; 
Requiring more rest..r:i.ctive standards than those generally required this 
ordina..n.ce. 
Section 2(A)ofthe City of Driggs' Ordinance 274-07. 
of these would be applicable to uses listed in Chapter2, Section 13(B), none 
appear applicable to the height regulation in Section 13(C). Idaho Code clearly states 
a CUP can only be granted "'subject to conditions pursuant to provisions of 
ordinance." The County does not feel that there are any conditions that are specific to 
height variation provision of Section 13(C). 
When the County does consider conditions a-g listed above, it is clear that the 
failed to show how they could be met The applicant did not show the County 
foe adverse impact ofthis height increase could be minimized nor can the County 
CV.CS . .LI-U.•. LV a way to minimize the impacts of a building that is 30 feet higher than the 45 
maximum. The applicant did introduce some "line of sight" evidence but the County 
had with t:bis evidence. Chairma.TJ. Young explained his skepticism 
;.u.,,uuv such as the site angle that was used on pages 40: 12 - 41: 11 of the 
l '.:>, transcript. The County finds it cannot the 
timing or duration of the height, once it is allowed it would continue, sequence, timing 
and thus cannot be adequately controlled. The maintenance of the extra 30 feet 
is equally difficult to condition and the applicant provided no suggestions. 
Maintenance of a development usually refers to trash, weeds, etc., none of which are 
concerns 75 feet up in the air. The exact location and nature of the development could not 
IIlJillIIllZe · of the additional 30 Even though the applicant suggests that 
,.a~.v.u.,""' the structure several feet from the property line would minirmze its impact, the 
Commissioners do not agree. Because the applicant needs the building to not only be 75 
tall, but 60 feet wide these conditions are impossible to meet; applicant is not asking 
for a 75 foot cell tower a pencil in the air- but a 60 x 75 foot building. Likewise, the 
County fi..nds that no on-site facilities or services or more restrictive standards could 
TIJirijmize the impact of a building this and the applicant agai.."'1 provided no 
suggestions as to how this condition could be met. The County thus is unable to grant 
the CUP subject to conditions pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance. 
C. The C1JP could not be granted subject to the ability of political subdivisions, 
including school districts to provide services for the proposed use. 
subdivisions, including schools, would not be affected by the height 
Arnended Findings 
The is as 311 functional, 
rr,,,."""."'" into the community. sense of arrival at each end 
of the community should be dramatic, in keepmg with the beauty of Teton 
Valley and the surrounding mountains. New buildings should be setback from 
the highway, with ample landscaping, concealed and that 
draws cm. the western ai--id amcultural 
. ' 
Comprehensive Pla..11., Section Page 61. One of the stated actions under 
9.4 is to "[c]reate and maintain attractive to Driggs on Highway 
(South and Norili) and on Ski Hill Road." County finds that application conflicts 
with the Driggs' Comprehensive Plai--i because it creates a large industrial structure that 
cannot adequately shielded in area Driggs would like to see become a 
memorable gateway. 
Because a concrete batch is a permitted use the 1 zone it is not possible 
County to impose conditions on the use of the batch plant. This application is not 
the uses that-will be conducted on the property but about height of the building 
which uses will be conducted. When the applicant was granted a conditional zone 
were moderating conditions such as landscaping imposed, but none of the 
conditions addressed a 7 5 foot height because it was a zone change process and the 
height of buildings was not at issue. Now the County is presented with this application 
for a conditional use permit to allow a building that is significantly higher than any other 
in the area. The County has not been presented with any plausible way to mitigate the 
extra 30 feet of height now being requested, nor is it able to craft any conditions that 
would assure uses and neighborhoods protection and 
compatibility \A,rit..n the additional 30 feet ofheight.3 The County therefore finds that a 75 
foot height is not compatible with the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood 
where a maximum of 45 feet for all structures is maintained and that the protection and 
compatibility of the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood cannot be assured and 
3 No :mitigation to surrounding neighbors was offered.As mentioned earlier, the did present the 
idea that the 7 5 foot tall by 60 foot wide building back from the edge of the property line would 
the additional 30 feet viewed from the because the 
out at the hearing that he was not persuaded by the line 
argument because the sight angle would be lower, the top of the building would still be so 
t.1-iat it would even project above the crest of the Tetons, unlike any the 
TETON C01JNTY: 
~/11,~~ Kathy~, Commissioner 
~-;;-~~ 
Robert Benedict, Commissioner 

storm water retention pond was attached as Exhibit "B" to CUP 
Renderings proposed building were also attached as Exhibit . AR 
photo graph of a temporary batch plant facility, which is not enclosed and which does not incorporate 
any of the mitigating features Bums proposed, was also attached as Exhibit "D" to the Application. 
AR p. 9. Elevation views of the facility, as enclosed by a proposed wall and landscaping, were also 
attached as Exhibit . l\Rp. 10. concrete plant was specifically designed to operate in an 
energy-efficient manner using state-of-the-art dust control systems. Ibid. The enclosed building was 
ii1tended to mitigate sound, dust and vibration, as well as provide an ex-terior that would 
harmonious and compatible with buildings on surrounding properties. Ibid. 
(45) only 
eighteen (18) percent of the floor space of the entire building. AR p. 127. This section of the 
building was necessary in order to enclose dust collection system and to prevent noise from 
disturbing adjacent agricultural and industrial uses. Ibid. If the building height was limited to forty-
five ( 45) feet, the plant would not be able to operate on an energy efficient basis and would require 
extended operating hours in order to meet the local demands for concrete. Ibid. In the absence of 
such equipment, the plant would be able to operate only as a transport plant which would have 
increased noise and dust emanating from the site. CUP Tr Vol Il, p. 10, LL. 1 through 25. Such 
height li.rnitation would also have reduced the production capabilities of the plant, thereby creating 
the likelihood that concrete would need to be brought into Teton Valley from. elsewhere. Such 
6 - APPELLANTS BRIEF 
concrete not 
through 
ISSUES 
1. the Board's use of the Comprehensive Plan and the broad, general goals stated 
therein, as a regulatory ordinance violate Burns' due process rights under the Constitutions of the 
United States and the State ofidaho, as well as this Court's holding in Urrutia v. Blaine County? 
2. Did Teton County's use of the Comprehensive Plan to impose additional requirements 
for a CUP beyond 
3. findings and conclusions arbitrary and capricious because they do not 
the 
Idaho Code§ 67-6535? 
Did the Board abuse its discretion by revisiting the issue of consistency wifh the 
Comprehensive Plan notwithstanding the passage of the applicable appeal period under Idaho Code 
§ 67-6519(4)? 
5. Is Bums entitled to an award of attorneys fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
1 
ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL 
Burns seeks attorneys fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117 for the reason that the 
County's denial of the CUP permit was \vithout a reasonable basis in law or in Specifically, 
7 - APPELLANT'S BRJEF 

nature case is adequately set m 
as as Respondent's 
Bums has no objection to the County's Statement of except with respect to its 
statement that "throughout the Driggs Comprehensive Plan, the area north of Driggs is referred to 
as a 'gateway'." Resp. Brief, p. 9. As was noted Appellant's Brief, the term "gateway" was 
nowhere defined in the Comprehensive Plan, in terms length or v.ridth. App. Brief, pp. 14-
16. The term itself suggests a "bookend" concept no particular dimensions. Burns' proposed 
be located five hundred 
corridor established by Teton County. AR 
(550) of Highway well 
The scenic conidor parallels Highway 
side. Appendix E, section 8-5-2(d)(l), only extends hundred thirty (330) on 
County Zoning Ordinance. As will argued below, the undefined parameters of such 
-
"gateway" in large part lead to Burns' due process argument, as outlined in pages 10-17, inclusive, 
of Appellant's Opening Brief. 
brief comment should also be made with respect to Burns' response to Commissioner 
noted in Respondenf s Brief, at the time the rezone was sought Burns contemplated a building height 
approximately forty-five ( 4 5) feet. Resp. Brief p. 7. At that point in time, the plant had not yet 
been designed and was conceptual in nature Burn.s later learned that by increasing the height 
2 APPELLANT'S REPLY BRlEF 
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r 
more 
ill 
vibration could be minimized, thereby diminishing impact on adjoining properties. AR p. 10. 
Anticipating that these changes would render t.h.e project more compatible with adjacent properties 
a..nd anticipating that the Commissioners would welcome such changes, Bu..rns filed its application 
for a CUP four months later. 
Chairman Young's question demonstrated his apparent ignorance of the rezoning process. 
Since the matter involved a rezone, the Board should have been focusing upon all permitted uses in 
the M-1 zone, rather than the particular height of Burns' proposed building. Chairman Young's 
perspective of zoning fits the classic definition of spot zoning-that is, zoning solely with respect 
to the particular use in front of the governing board. Since building heights in excess of forty-five 
( 4 5) feet were expressly permitted as a conditional use in the M-1 zone, the ConLrnissioners should 
have known foat by granting the rezone, they would open up that possibility, not only for Burns, but 
anyone else in the zone. Burus' later CUP application was clearly consistent with that conditional 
use and there is certainly nothing insidious about Bums' follow-on CUP application, based on Burns' 
desire to enhance environmental compatibility. Burns was merely pursuing exactly what it was 
entitled to do under the Driggs CUP Ordinance. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 

Dale Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Ha.1-m & 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Kirk Burns 
Concrete, L"'1.c. 
2385 Gallatin Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
April 9, 2012 
Dear Dale: 
In accordance with Paragraph 2(b )(vi) of the Development Agreement for Burns Holding, 
filed Teton County as Instrument# 191250 on September 5, 2007, the County is hereby 
revoking Burns Holding's authority to operate "Temporary Facility." Your client has until 
July 1, 2012 to remove the temporary facility. If removal preparations are not commenced 
15, 2012, provide a written for a for vv,.uu1vs,.vu 
of the removal in keeping with the July 1, 2012 deadline. 
Teton County Board of CoTu.'lty Commissioners 
Kathryn Rinaldi, Chair 

October 4, 2012 
Dear Mr. Burns: 
On April 9, 2012 the County sent you a written request to remove your "Temporary 
by July 1, 2012. Nothing has been done to remove the facility as of the date of the 
present letter. In accordance with Paragraph 2(b)(vi) of the Development Agreement for Bums 
Holding, LLC filed in Teton County as Instrument# 191250 on September 5, 2007, the County 
has revoked Burns Holding's authority to operate their Facility." Please commence 
removal activity immediately. 
kimberlydevans@hotrnail.com 
Plaintiffs/ Counterdefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho Case No. CV-2013-165 
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff sf Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of 
State of Idaho, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
I, KIRK BURNS, being duly swom~pon oath, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am the manager of Burns Holdings, LLC and the president of Burns Concrete, 
Inc., who are the plaintiffs in the above-captioned lawsuit. 
2. Within days after I signed the Developer's Agreement dated August 31, 2007 
between Bums Holdings, LLC and Teton County (the "Agreement"), I met with Teton County's 
planning and zoning, Kurt Hibbert, to determine whether any permit was necessary 
4837-2994-2560.2 
after my Hibbert, 
installation on, property 
Exhibit "A" to the Agreement and the construction of the road and highway improvements 
required under Paragraph 2.d(iv) of the greemem (the "Road and Highway 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a letter dated October 
15, 2007 from my engineer establishing that all of the required (and bonded) road improvements 
had been completed, which the City of Driggs countersigned on October 16, 2007. And attached 
hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of a letter erroneously dated September 6, 2007, 
release the letter of credit Bums Concrete, Inc. posted to ensure proper completion of the 
Road and Highway Improvements. Copies of both of these letters were received in the ordinary 
course of business by Bums Concrete, and were ( and are) retained in business records. 
5. Moreover, substantially all, if not 100%, of the work described in Paragraph 3 
above, together with the additional work described in Paragraph 19 of the complaint I verified 
and caused to be filed in the above-captioned lawsuit, was completed prior to the November 15, 
2007 hearing of the Teton County Board of County Commissioners, when they unexpectedly 
voted to deny issuance of a conditional use permit for the construction of the "Permanent 
Facility" required to be constructed pursuant to Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Agreement. 
2 
4837-2994-2560.2 
this of November 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to 
4837-2994-2560.2 
correct 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Kathy Spitzer 
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
89 N. Main St., Suite 5 
Driggs, 83422 
Facsimile: (208) 354.2994 
483 7-2994-2560 .2 
to be method 
(vJU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(0facsimile 
October 15, 2007 
Teton County Pla..11...'1ing and Zoning Department 
89N. Main 
Driggs, ID 83422 
RE: Burns Concrete Development, Project No. 07527 .00 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
This letter is to certify to Teton County that t..he bonded for road improvements on Casper 
Drive relating to the Burns Concrete Development have been constructed in general 
accordance with the approved and pern:litted plans and per the City of Driggs specifications 
and requirements. 
At this time, we are requesting that the bond be released for this project. 
Please call to discuss any questions you 
Sincere]y, 
JORGENSEN ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Margaret S. Gillentine, P.E. 
cc: File 
r 
The ~ity of Driggs agrees that road 1m1:Jro·ven11eIJlts 
7
~:;dtf:Md,kv-:::=:::=:=::====-----
ared Gunderson, City of Driggs Public Works Director 
{) 
East Littie Avenue · P.O. Box 584 • 
constructed per Driggs 
Date 
-- PLANNING AND BUILDING DEP AR.'11'1ENT 
~ \ 
September 6, 2007 
Bank of Idaho 
Jeffrey E. Jones 
PO Box 1487 
399 North Capital 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
RE: Letter of Credit #204 
Dear Mr. Jones, 
We have received a Stamped Engineers letter from Jorgensen Associates; PC stating that 
the infrastructure for Burns Concrete has been completed. We are hereby requesting the 
release of the letter of credit #204 for Burns Concrete. 
This letter is to authorize this request. 
Tr;:qou, 
y~'4~ 
Jdie Lehmann 
Deputy Planning Admlnistrator 
Teton County, Idaho 
89 !'·'forth ?vta[n Str!::et~ Suite 41 Drlggs 1 IduhG~ 83422 
{r"\" \., · 4 ') 50 ··, ! r~on· ,- ·1 - --of; 
, ... l10 1 ..;Y • ,_ .,.> pt tOn e \ .:: o) JY· '6 // 0 3:( 
W W,v . tetO l1COUfltyidaho.gOV 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of 
of Idaho, 
Case No. CV-2013-165 
MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO TETON 
COUNTY'S MOTION 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I. INCORPORATION OF PENDING MOTIONS 
Plaintiffs Burns Holdings, LLC and Burns Concrete, Inc. (jointly, "Burns") filed on 
August 11, 2014, both (a) their motion for partial summary judgment against Defendant Teton 
County, Idaho ("Teton County"), and (b) their motion to file an amended reply to Teton 
County's Counterciaim, for the purpose of pleading as additional affirmative defenses the 
doctrines of quasi-estoppel and prevention of performance, among others. Because of the 
extensive overlap between the foregoing two motions and Teton County's own motion for 
SU11unary judgment filed September 18, 20i4, and in order to avoid burdening the Court from 
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Complaint2 Counterclaim,3 and 
Afifjidavit.4 and 
':I , 
the additional affirmative defenses set forth in paragraphs 29-32 of Exhibit A to the motion. 
The dispute before the Court relates to the interpretation of that certain Developer's 
Agreement made by and between Bums Holdings, LLC and Teton County (the "Agreement") 
dated August 31, 2007, which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Complaint. Neither Burns nor 
Teton County argues that Agreement is ambiguous with respect to any of its relevant 
provisions. See, e.g., County's Memorandum6 at 9 ("the only question is one of law regarding 
the applicability of force majeure clause."). Accordingly, notwithstanding Teton County's 
lengthy argument concerning the change over time the height of Burns' proposed concrete 
batch plant, the pre-contract factual circumsta_nces are irrelevant to the Court's interpretation of 
the force majeure clause in the Agreement. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc. v. Clear Springs Foods, 
1 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 
August 11, 2014 ("Burns' MSJ Memorandum"). 
2 Verified Complaint for: (i) Declaratory Judgment, (ii) Breach of Contract and 
Rescission, (iii) Unjust Enrichment, filed May 21, 2013 ("Complaint"). 
3 Answer and Counterclaim, filed June 11, 2013 ("Answer and Counterclaim"). 
4 Affidavit of Kimberly D. Evans Ross, filed August 11, 2014 ("Ross Affidavit"). 
5 Motion to Amended Reply to Counterclaim, filed August 11, 2014 ("Motion to 
Amend"). 
6 Memorandum Support of Summary Judgment, filed September 18, 2014 ("County's 
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reason submitted County is 
irrelevant to the resolution of this contract dispute, it clearly establishes that "everybody" 
understood that the construction of a 75' high building not later than 
July 11, 2007--or 50+ days before execution of the Agreement-when the Agreement was 
approved by the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission. See County's Memorandum Ex. G at 
3, LL. 14-23. Indeed, the 75' height of the proposed building was expressly mentioned at least 
15 times at that public hearing. See id. at p 4, L. 1; p. 8, 8; p. l 0, LL. 11 & 14; p. 11, LL. l 
& 23; p. 19, LL. 1, 6 & 17; p. 20, LL. 3-4 p. 26, 13; and p. 28, L. 3. The implication that 
the county was somehow hoodwinked by Burns into agreeing to its proposed 
batch plant thus flies the face of the evidentiary record submitted to 
County. 
III. ADDITIONAL FACTS 
high concrete 
Court by Teton 
In addition to those factual matters set forth in Part II Burns ' MSJ Memorandum, 
which have been incorporated by reference, the following factual matters are established by the 
Affidavit of Kirk Burns ("Burns Ajf."), filed concurrently herewith. 
l. After the Agreement had been executed and shortly before the temporary concrete 
batch plant (the "Temporary Facility") was delivered to the property described in Exhibit "A" of 
the Agreement (the "Property"), Kirk Burns, in his capacity as the manager of Holdings, 
and the president of Burns Concrete, met 
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2. Immediately meeting, the 
improvements 
required under Paragraph 2.d(iv) of the Agreement. Substantially all, if not 100%, such work 
additional work described in Paragraph 19 of the Complaint was completed prior to the 
November 15, 2007 hearing of the Teton County Board of County Commissioners, when they 
unexpectedly voted to deny Burns a conditional use permit to construct the 75' high building 
depicted in Exhibit C to the Agreement (the "Permanent Facility"). Burns Alf ,r 3-5. 
3. At no time since the installation of the Temporary Facility on the Property has 
been notified by any representative of Teton County that a .., ..... cuuc of type is required 
for continued maintenance or use of the Temporary Facility on the Property. Burns Ajf ,I 6. 
ARGUMENT 
Teton County concludes its argument with the following summation: 
Interpretation of a contract provision is a question of law 
and thus is appropriate for summary judgment. The contract 
provision at issue in this case is the force majeure clause. All 
claims stem from Burns' mistaken belief that the force majeure 
clause protects them from performing. 
County's Memorandum 23. Although Burns concurs with the first two sentences of Teton 
County's foregoing summation, the final sentence is patently wrong. For as argued at length in 
Burns' AfSJ Memorandum, Bums claims against Teton County are grounded not only in the 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO TETON COUNTY'S MOTION 
JUDCMENT-4 
SUMMARY 
affirmative 
clause. 
Nevertheless, Bums and rebuts below the principal arguments made by Teton 
in the same sequence as in 's Memorandum. 
A. Because Burns Could Not Anticipate That Teton County \Vould Prevent 
rns from Constructing Permanent Facility1 Burns Not Breached the Agreement. 
The term "force majeure" is defined in the most current version of Black's Law 
Dictionary to mean: 
An event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor controlled; 
esp., an unexpected event that prevents someone from doing or 
something that he or she had agreed or officially 
planned to do. term includes both acts of nature (e.g., floods 
and acts of people and 
LAW DICTIONARY 761 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). And as Bums and Teton 
County concur, one of the legal questions now before the Court "is whether Bums' performance 
be delayed by force majeure clause found in Paragraph 2(b)(iv) of the Agreement." 
County's lvfemorandum 9. In this regard, Teton County argues: "There are no material facts in 
dispute, all decisions are well documented and the facts are clear. The only thing that is not clear 
7 See Burns' MSJ Memorandum 15. 
8 See id. at l 6-17. 
9See at19-2l. 
at 
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a 
quoted in Burns' MSJ Memorandum: 
It is a general principle contract t.l-iat if one pa.rty to a 
contract hinders, prevents or makes impossible performance by the 
other party, the latter's failure to perform will be excused. This 
general principle has been referred to as the doctrine of prevention. 
Under the doctrine, a contracting party whose performance of its 
promise is prevented by the other party is not obligated to peiform 
and is excused from any further offer of performance. In tum, the 
preventing party is not allowed to recover damages for the 
resulting nonperformance or otherwise benefit from its own 
wrongful acts. When a promisor prevents, hinders, or renders 
impossible the occurrence of a condition precedent to its promise 
to perform, or to the performance of a return promise, the promisor 
is not relieved of the obligation to perform and may not legally 
terminate the contract for nonperformance. Furthermore, the 
promisor may not invoke the other party's nonperformance as a 
defense when it is sued on t.he contract. In short, under the 
doctrine of prevention, when a party to a contract causes the 
failure of the performance of the obligation due, it cannot in any 
way take advantage of that failure. 
* * * 
The principle that prevention by one party excuses performance by 
the other applies to both the performance of a condition and of a 
promise and may be laid down broadly as applying to every 
contract. Whether interference by one party to a contract amounts 
to prevention so as to excuse performance by the other party and 
constitute a breach by the interfering party is a question of fact to 
be decided by the jury under all of the proved facts and 
circumstances. 
* * * 
The rationale underlying the prevention doctrine, pursuant to 
which the nonperformance by one party to the contract is excused 
when the other party to the contract hinders, prevents, or makes 
impossible that performance, is two-fold. First, the doctrine is 
based on the long-established principle of law that a party should 
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promisor or 
s liability depends, it cannot 
Second, the principle of prevention is based on the implied 
agreement of the parties to a contract to proceed in good faith and 
cooperate in performing the contract in accordance with its 
expressed intent a.11d, therefore, to refrain from committing any 
intentional act or omission that would interfere with the other 
party or prevent or make it impossible for the other party to 
perform. 
13 RICHARD LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS§§ 39:3 & 39:6 (4th ed., updated May 2014) 
(footnotes omitted; emphasis added). Accord 17A AM. JuR. 2d Contracts§ 686 (2004); l7B 
CJ.S. Contracts§ 703 (2011). 
Accordingly, as held in Sullivan v. Bullock, 124 Idaho 738, P.2d 184, 
188-89 under Idaho the act 
preventing a party's performance is "unreasonable, in other words, outside the contemplation of 
the parties as expressed in the contract.;' (Emphasis added.) The question therefore becomes 
whether, at the time the was executed on August 31, 2007, the parties contemplated 
that Teton County would deny Burns the zoning approvals required to construct the 75' 
Permanent Facility that was depicted on Exhibit C to the Agreement and incorporated into the 
I l 
I l Agreement i 2.b(iii): "Attached as "B"-site Plan, and Exhibit 
Building Elevations, and by this incorporated herein arc plans for construction of 
Developer's intended permanent ("Permanent Facility"). (Bolding in italics 
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Immediately upon execution of this Agreement, 
Developer shall order and commence construction of the 
Permanent Facility. installation of Permai."1ent Facility 
shall be completed within eighteen (18) months of execution of 
this Agreement by the County, subject to delays resulting from 
weather, strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or 
other act of force majeure or action beyond Developer's 
control. 
(v) In order to facilitate and support the construction of the 
Permanent Facility and to allow the Developer to expedite 
commercial operations, the Developer shall erect and operate a 
temporary concrete batch plant on site as shown in Exhibit 
Site Plan and Exhibit "D." 
Agreement ,,i 2.b(iv)-(v) (holding in original; italics added). And because these contractual 
erect and operate Temporary Facility, rather than delaying or conditioning 
performance until some later date or the occurrence of some future event, there can be no 
legitimate question but that the parties contemplated on August 31, 2007 that Teton County 
would promptly grant Bums zoning approvals required to construct the 
Although application of the doctrine of prevention is of itself a sufficient basis for the 
denial of Teton County's motion, both the doctrine's application and the facts supporting its 
12 the above-quoted provisions were not dispositive, there would then be a material 
question of fact. See above quote from Williston and Sullivan, 124 Idaho at 743 n.2, 864 P.2d 
at 189. However, Teton County has not submitted a scintilla of evidence supporting a finding 
that the parties did not intend Bums to immediately commence construction of 
Facility following execution of the Agreement. Nor could any such evidence 
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dispute. the at U.lU Cogeneration V. 
Board of Governors for Higher Education, 915 F.Supp. 1267 (D.R.I. 1996), was included in a 
contract between parties to the dispute, but the required zoning approval was denied by a 
stranger to the contract, the Tovvn of South Kingston. Id. at 1286. 
Or stated in the language used in determining the application of force majeure clauses, 
while parties to a contract may well anticipate that a local jurisdiction not bound by 
contractual obligation to either party may decide not to issue a zoning approval, it was plainly 
unanticipated by the parties here that Teton County would not promptly issue the zoning 
approvals required for Burns to construct the Facility depicted in the 
unforseeability of Teton County's unexpected change of heart and denial of 
The 
CUP 
application is particularly obvious because, as the county admits: "Burns applied for the CUP on 
June 13, 2007--over two months before the Agreement was executed." County's Memorandum 
13. 
One final point of clarification. The question now before the Court has nothing to do 
with whether Teton County had the legal right to deny Bums the zoning approvals needed to 
construct the Perma11ent Facility. Burns acknowledges that the county had this right. The 
question, rather, is whether Teton County had the right to enter into the Agreement, and thereby 
require Bums to expend hundreds of thousands of dollars, including constructing public road and 
highway improvements for the county's benefit, see Complaint ,i 19, and then, after denying 
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FOR PARTIAL 
not allow local governments (nor 
summary judgment on Count I of its Counterclaim for breach of contract. 
B. Burns 
Temporary Facility Compiied vVith 
Not Entitled to Declaratory Relief. 
to conduct 
is not to 
Teton County 
With but the one exception discussed below, Count II of Teton County's Counterclaim 
for declaratory judgment is dependent on this Court's entry of summary judgment on Count I of 
the Counterclaim for breach of contract. See, e.g., County's Memorandum at 14 ("The delay in 
performance is not excusable and thus the County may rezone the property."); at 19 ("The 
County now requests a declaration from the Court that a reasonable time for performance has 
passed and the County is free to move forward with its application to rezone the property."); at 
20 ("If the Court determines that the force majeure clause is not applicable, than [sic] the 
County's request that the Temporary Facility be removed is proper. 07). However, because for the 
reasons just discussed Teton County is not entitled to summary judgment on Counterclaim for 
breach of contract, the arguments made at pages 14-20 of the County's Memorandum are 
irrelevant. 
For the first time since the Temporary Facility was installed on the Property over seven 
years ago, 13 Teton County now asserts that "[t]he Temporary Facility violates the International 
Building Code as by County and the Driggs Area of Impact height regulation." 
13 
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if 
thought the Building 
or Driggs of Impact height County raised 
these issues somewhere, somehow, sometime before filing the County's Memorandum. Indeed, 
County was required to do so by the terms the Agreement. See 
Notice of Default shall specify the nature of the alleged default ... "). 
Nevertheless, Teton County now asserts that the Temporary Facility is in violation of the 
IBC because "Burns never applied for or received a building permit for the Temporary Facility." 
County's .Memorandum 21. Teton County relies on the following provision of the IBC its 
argument: 
105.1 Required: Any owner or authorized agent who intends to 
construct, enlarge, alter, repair, move, or change 
occupancy of a building or structure, or to erect, install, enlarge, 
alter, repair, remove, convert or replace any electrical, gas, 
mechanical, or plumbing system, the installation of which is 
regulated by this code, or to cause any such work to be done, shall 
first make application to the building official and obtain the 
required permit. 
Id (emphasis added). Teton county's argument is therefore directly dependent on there being a 
"required permit" for the Temporary Facility.15 
14 See County's Memorandum at Ex. H (notice of revocation dated April 9, 2012) and at 
I (notice of revocation dated October 4, 2012). 
not to have obtained a 
not 
EMORANDlJM IN OPPOSITION TO TETON COUNTY'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
.JUDGMENT-
4842-2li2-79682 
permit with 
but and 
zoning confirmed before the Temporary Facility was installed that no permit was required to be 
for the installation operation of the Temporary Facility on the Property. Burm Ajf 
~ 2. Or stated in a nutshell, there was no "required permit') for the installation of the Temporary 
Facility that Burns failed to obtain before it was installed on the Property. 
Finally, Burns makes two arguments with respect to Teton County's concluding 
argument that the Temporary Facility violates the height limitation now contained in Driggs 
Code 9-7E-6. 
First, 
application 
County fails to submit either a copy of the referenced ordinance or support 
connection with the Temporary Facility and the are 
situated in Teton County and not the City of Driggs. Second, even if the referenced ordinance 
was established to be generally applicable to ihe Temporary Facility, the ordinance was not 
adopted until June 15, 2010 nearly three years after Temporary Facility had been 
l6 See Exhibit attached hereto. In the event the Court should elect to take judicial 
of Driggs Code 9-7E-6, Bums requests that the Court also take judicial notice of its date 
of enactment, as set forth on attached exhibit and posted on the City of Driggs' website 
20 l Notice of adjudicative and 
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II 
V .. 
Based on the points authorities set forth above and in Burns' MSJ Memorandum, 
Teton County's motion for summary judgment should be denied in its entirety, with partial 
summary judgment instead being entered in Burns' favor, thereby leaving only the amount of 
damages to which Burns is entitled for determination at trial. 
I) 1zcl 
DATED this .iL_ day of November 2014. 
l 7 The applicable concerning nonconforming uses is set forth in Kootenai County v. 
Harriman-Sayler, 154 Idaho 13, 293 P.3d 637 (2013): 
A nonconforming use is "a use of land which lawfolly existed prior to the 
enactment of a zoning ordinance and which is maintained after the effective date 
of the ordinance even though not in compliance with use restrictions." Baxter v. 
City of Preston, 115 Idaho 607, 608-09, 768 P.2d 1340, 1341-42 (1989) 
( emphasis added) ( citing 6 Rohan, Zoning & Land Use Controls § 41.01 [1] 
(1978)). It is a property-right protection based upon the state and federal due 
process clauses. Id. ( citing Glengary-Gamlin Protective Ass 'n v. Bird, 106 Idaho 
84, 675 P.2d 344 (Ct. App. 1983); Boise City v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 789, 572 P.2d 
892 (1977); 0 'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949)). 
Often referred to as a "grandfather right/' a nonconforming use "simply protects 
the owner from abrupt termination of what had been a lawful condition or activity 
on the property .... 
18,293 at 
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correct the foregoing 
to be 
addressed to the following: 
Kathy Spitzer 
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
89 N. Main St, Suite 5 
Driggs, ID 83422 
Facsimile: (208) 354.2994 
by the method 
(v)'U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) 2vemight Mail 
(''J Facsimile 
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I 9-7E-5 9-7E-8 
9-7E·5: SETBACK REQUIREMENTS: 
A. Front Yard: The front yard setback shall be a minimum of twenty feet 
(20') when a lot abuts, touches , adjoins, or is across the street from 
a residential district; otherwise , no front yard setback is req uired. 
B. Side Yards: The side yard shall be a minimum of twenty feet (20') 
when a lot abuts, touches, or adjoins a residential district; otherwise, 
no side yard setback is required. 
C. Rear Yard: The rear yard sha ll be a minimum of twenty feet (20') 
when a fat abuts, touches, or adjoins a residentral district; otherwise, 
no rear yard setback is required. (Ord. 281-07, 9-4-2007) 
9-7E-6: BUILDING HEIGHT: 
A. Maximum Height: Any building or structure or portion thereof 
hereafter erected shall not exceed forty five feet (45'} in height 
above grade, unless a height exception is granted by the planning 
and zoning commission following the procedures in chapter 2, article 
D of this title. 
B. Height Step Down: Buildings shall not exceed thirty five feet (35') in 
height when located less than one hundred feet (100') from any 
residenUai or neighborhood commercial zone, unless a height 
exception is granted by the planning and zoning commission 
following the procedu res in chapter 2, article D of this title. Buildings 
that are partially within one hundred feet (100') of a residential zone 
shall step down in roof elevation (i.e., from 45 feet to 35 feet) to be 
consistent with the thirty five foot (35') limit. (Ord. 315-10, 
---->-- 6-15-2010) 
9-7E-7: OFF STREET PARKING AND LOADING REQUIREMENTS: 
Ali off street parking and loading shall be governed by chapter 
4 of this title. (Ord. 281-07, 9-4-2007; amd. 201 O Code) 
9-7E-8: 
June 2011 
SIGNS: The erection of signs is regulated by title 8, chapter 2 
of this code. (Ord. 281-07 , 9-4-2007) 
City of Driggs 
E hibit 
\ .. ~ 
those present 
date: 11/20/20 
Time: 10:05 am 
Judge: Dane Watkins Jr 
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen 
Plaintiffs Attorney Emily Evans Ross 
Defendant's Attorney Kathy Spitzer 
those present the courtroom 
case 
there was a defendant's reply, I don't think I got that 
take the file back to Bonneville 
court reporter; will record digitally 
No objections 
1010 
begins 
J=housekeeping matter - motion to amend reply to counterclaim 
Would like to file that pleading so it is official 
Summary Judgment - up for hearing today 
of a contract 
12 
started before 2006 and culminated in motion to get new zoning for batch plant 
Tried to work very closely with county and City of Driggs for location of plant 
It was the county and the city that chose the location and Burns Concrete bought the 
property they indicated 
Wrong zoning 
Development agreement not drafted at that time 
Feb 2007 county discussed potential height of the building 
reasons why BC needed a foot tall building 
was on board 
It approved and recommend the CUP 
also negotiated the terms of the development agreement 
Specifically addresses height of the 75 book building 
Obligated to build a 75' building 
Submitted at the same time 
1017 
Required immediate commencement other improvement 
In November 2007 county denied CUP 
B 
Position the tolling provision was triggered by the denial of the variance 
1020 
Essentially undoing everything benefitting BC 
Straight up legal issue 
is not able to build 75' building; 
October 04, 2012 served notice not going to be able to build and told to remove temporary 
building 
plant 
County's argument - doesn't apply 
not what contract says 
County height of the building is in BC control 
! f they were in control of the height of the building, it would be built by now 
had the city's approval when it was submitted to the County 
The development agreement demanded BC build the building 
1024 
Three legal concepts 
1 interpretation of the plain language 
2 doctrine prevention 
3-
are 
to 
BC does not take the position the County is estopped from denying the CUP 
Remedies available to the county 
County should be estopped from Invoking the provision of the contract that allows it to 
remove prior zoning 
BC county took position on 75' building when it obligated BC to build it 
In denying, county changed its position 
If it didn't want the building, it shouldn't have signed 
aclions are unconscionable 
no is possession of all improvements 
1031 
Tolling provision had begun tolling 
was estopped from to 
County sends notices saying we are undoing this 
The actions of the county are a material breach 
the 
agreement 
change in zoning 
When repudiation of a contract is so severe it destroys the purpose for which the contract 
is made 
Reliance damages 
of infrastructure required to provide 
remedies are 
sent was 09 12 
5 years since batch plant was in 
I can go off of is the public hearing record 
Don't know what conversations were had 
Don't know the city or county chose the site 
A lot of concern over the height of the building 
of representation was wouldn't be over 40' high; no higher than 
out there 
hangars that are 
Both parties knew no one could build a 75" tall building until a CUP was granted 
Height mentioned in exhibit in the back 
Couldn't have made a variance 
It is county jurisdiction 
City P&Z recommended CUP be granted 
1042 
Improvements not required to be begun immediately 
Immediately only used one time 
Why did they put the improvements in before CUP granted 
Should have gotten term immediately struck 
1046 
of contracting it was that they couldn't build a 
1 zone 
tall building 
was 
county's position stayed steadfast 
did a development agreement 
signing anything about a variance on the height; he didn't have that authorit"IJ 
Signing of Development Agreement didn't even happen at a public meeting 
They knew they needed that permission 
m up mind until after public hearing 
1 
is clear 
we have prevented them from building their 
the law 
is by requiring them to comply 
contemplated the CUP could have been denied 
County never changed it's position 
Denied CUP in November; first official act of the county on the height 
County has not done anything to rescind the contract 
We did go through a law suit for 5 years 
Going under 2(b)(6) 
had denial was proper 
is over 60 zoning a building 
Completely ignores the that it signed contract 
? county has police power to control the zoning 
Breach of a contract is a breach of a contract 
Essentially buyer beware; you should know better than to rely on a contract 
Not a land use issue; not a zoning issue; not a CUP issue 
Contract addresses the height of the building 
Buyer beware is unconscionable 
took when it 
1102 
in order to the construction 
contract 
was the it 
Not possible to comply with the provisions of the contract without a 
1105 
DA clear not sure how we breached the contract 
Contingent upon getting a CUP 
1107 
Will take the matter under advisement and issue a written decision 
it wiil take the full 30 days 
contract 
IN DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT THE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
BURNS CONCRPTE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
a political subdivision 
Case No. CV-2013-165 
ORDER 
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO AMENDED 
PLEADING 
The Motion to File Amended Reply to Counterclaim, filed August 11, 201 of Plaintiffs' 
Concrete, Inc. and Bums Holdings, Gointly, "Plaintiffs") having been duly noticed 
and heard by the Court at hearing held November 20, 2014; and Defendar1t Teton County 
("Defendant") having filed no opposition thereto nor otherwise having contested the grant of said 
motion; and the Court being duly advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs are granted leave to file and serve on 
aforesaid 
SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of WC,,cxA(':¥\-.J~2014, I caused a true 
and coITect copy of the foregoing [PROPOSED] GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO FILE AMENDED PLEADING to be served by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Kimberly D. Evans Ross 
1120 East 1275 North 
Shelley, ID 83274 
Facsimile: 208.357.0870 
Kathy Spitzer 
Teton County Prosecuting Attorney 
89 N. Main Street, Suite 5 
Driggs, ID 83422 
354.2994 
(~S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(ylli. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
vs. 
TETON a 
of the State of Idaho, 
Defendants. 
I. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
,~,,,,..,~, LLC 1 purchased property within Teton County with the intent of 
building a concrete plant on the purchased property. 
the impact." 
the property is located 
County and limits, it 
had previously agreed that areas the Driggs area impact would be subject to Driggs 
zoning laws. In order to construct the concrete batch plant, Bums sought a zoning change for the 
property from to (light industrial). 
February 26, 2007, Teton County approved requested zoning change subject to 
several conditions, including that it and Bums enter a development agreement, which would 
address concerns raised by the the February 26, 2007 public hearing. The 
applicable 
feet. 
ordinance for the property limited height buildings and structures to 45 
two are to 
and to 
Following a petition the district court upheld county's denial of 
On appeal, Idaho the Teton County Commissioners, 
holding that was required to seek a zoning variance, rather than a CUP. The Court 
reasoned that because, the was not permitted to grant a waiver of the height limitations 
a county did not err denying 
Following the 
the 
on 
Court's decision, 
structure. 
CUP. 
County Board of County 
4, 1 
sent Burns a revoking Bums' s authority to operate the temporary facility 
demanding the facility's removal property. 
then this 
declaratory judgment, breach contract and unjust enrichment. On August 11, 2014, Bums 
filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the liability components of its three causes of 
TetonCeunty filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 18, 2014. 
Court on the two summary judgment on 20, 
14. 
if 1s no 
and party is entitled to as a matter 
Grover v. Smith, 1 Idaho 46 1105; V. 
136 Idaho P.3d 577 (2002). burden at all times, on the moving party to 
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jordan v. Beek<;, 13 5 Idaho 5 86, 21 
908 (200 
at 
Supreme Comi, in Corp. v. Catrett, 477 317, 106 S.Ct. 
summary judgment bears the initial 
court of the basis for its and 
portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," 
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But unlike 
the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that 
the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials 
negating the opponent's clai"m. On contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to "the 
affidavits, if any" ( emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement. 
And if there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56( c) in this regard, such 
doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b ), which provide the claimants and 
defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment "with or without 
supporting affidavits" (emphasis added). The import of these subsections is that, 
regardless of whether the moving party accompanies summary judgment 
motion with , and should, be granted so long as 
is before district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of 
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied. One of the principal 
purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually 
unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way 
that allows it to accomplish this purpose. 
, 106 S at 2553 (alterations original). 
are to 
non-
court to inferences non-
party. v. Ratliff 134 Idaho 999 P.2d 892 (2000); V. 
Idaho 802, 10 P.3d l (Ct. 
at 
The Idaho appellate courts have followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
which stated: 
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural 
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are 
designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action." ... Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only the rights of 
claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have 
those claims and tried to a jury, but also 
106 at 
defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided 
claims and defenses have no factual basis. 
( citations omitted); see Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 
137 Idaho 747, 330 Thomson v. of Lewiston, 13 7 Idaho 50 P.3d 488 
A party whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest on his pleadings 
but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must come forward by way 
of affidavit, admissions or other documentation to establish the existence of material 
issues of fact, preclude the issuance of summary judgment. Anderson v. Hollingsworth, 
136 P .3d 228 (2001 ); v. Craney, I Idaho 166, 16 P 263 (2000). The 
case, 
mere not to create a issue 
1 
to 
at 
cease to to 
facie case. Trailer Park v. Frede kind, 131 Idaho 634, 962 P.2d 1018, (1998). 
a situation, can be no issue of material since a complete failure proof 
concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other 
facts immaterial. Id 
trial court is not permitted to the evidence or resolve 
controverted factual issues when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. AID 
v. Armstrong, 119 IdaJ10 897, 900, 811 P.2d 507, 510 (Ct.App.1991). 
However, where the "evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather 
a jury will be trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite 
of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible 
conflict between those inferences." Riverside Development Co. 
103 Idaho 515, 51 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982). See Ins. 
at 900, 811 P.2d at 510 (if the court will the ultimate of fact, 
have moved for summary judgment and the motions are based on the 
same evidentiary facts, then "summary judgment even though 
cont1icting inferences are possible, so long as all the evidence is confined entirely 
to record"); Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469, 470, 91, 92 
1985) judge will be the trier of fact, he or she is to arrive 
at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary 
Small v. 1 Idaho , 334,971 P.2d 1151, 1158 (Ct. 1998); accord Drew v. 
Sorensen, 13 Idaho 539,989 P.2d 1 (1999). 
such 
to award attorney fees is left to the discretion court. 
, l Idaho 73, 1 
for so 
period in Paragraph the Agreement ... has been 
tolled until Teton County has taken all such action within its control as is ui:;1cc::o,::,a1.v 
to permit Burns's construction of the Pennanent Facility ... " 
in Support of Ps' for Partial Sun1n1. J. at 21. 
1. 
The Agreement between Burns and Teton County provides: 
2. sole use allowed and restrictions 
pursuant to this conditional rezone as reflected in this Agreement are as 
a. The property shall be used exclusively the operation a ready-
mix concrete manufacturing facility. 
the current time property 
as described paragraph l. 
recommendation was based upon execution of this development 
responsibilities and obligations pertaining to certain matters relating to 
improvement and of the property. This development and operation 
shall subject to following terms and in addition to other 
tenns hereof: 
(ii) All operations on the property shall comply with all 
applicable and governing local, state or U.S. ordinances and Jaws relating to dust, 
noise, water quality and air quality. 
(iii) as plan, and "C" -
Elevations, and by this reference incorporated herein are plans for 
construction of Developer's intended permanent facility ("Permanent Facility"). 
(iv) Immediately upon execution of this Agreement, Developer 
commence construction the Permanent Facility. The 
the Permanent Facility shall completed within (1 
to 
it 
Temporary 
is to allow Developer to Developer's 
the Pennanent Facility is constructed. The authority to operate Temporary 
Facility shall tenninate upon completion of Permanent Facility even if sooner 
than the described eighteen (18) month period. 
5. The execution of this Agreement shall be 
deemed written consent by Developer to change the zoning of the subject property 
to its prior designation upon failure to comply with the conditions imposed by this 
Agreement. No reversion shall take place until after a hearing on this matter 
pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6511 Upon notice and hearing, as provided in this 
Agreement and in Idaho Code §67-6509, if the property described in attached 
Exhibit is not used as approved, or if the approved use ends or is abandoned, 
the Board of county Commissioners may, upon receiving a recommendation from 
-,,,.,,,... board, order that the property will revert to zoning 
designation (and land uses allowed by that zoning designation) 
prior to the rezone 1.e., revert 
C3, Service and Highway zonmg designation. 
8. In the event of a default or breach of this 
Ag:rec~mi;:m or of any of terms or conditions, the party alleging default shall 
give the breaching party not less than thirty (30) days Notice of Default, in 
\vriting, u..rtless an emergency exists threatening the health and safety of the 
public. If such an emergency exists, written notice shall be given in a reasonable 
time and manner in light of the circumstances of the breach. The time of the 
giving of the notice shall be measured from the date of the written Notice of 
Default. The Notice of Default specify the nature the and, 
where appropriate, the manner and period of time during which said default may 
be satisfactorily cured. During any period of curing, the party charged shall not be 
considered in default for the purposes of termination or zoning reversion, or the 
institution of legal proceedings. the default is cured, then no default shall exist 
charging shall take no further action. 
1 to comply with all 
to 
\\Then interpreting a contract, this Court begins vvith the 
language. In the absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in 
its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning derived 
from the plain wording of the instrument. Interpreting an unambiguous 
contract and determining whether there has been a violation of that 
contract is an issue of law subject to free review. A contract tenn is 
ambiguous when there are two different reasonable interpretations or the 
is nonsensical. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of 
an ambiguous term is an issue of fact. 
226 P.3d 1277, 1280 10) (internal citations and quotations 
139 Idaho 770, a 
to be unambiguous effect must be decided by the district court as a 
matter of it is only when that instrument is found to be ambiguous that 
evidence as to meaning of that may be submitted to the finder of 
fact. Id "[E]vidence custom or may not be introduced to or 
contradict terms a plain and unambiguous contract.. .. " Id at 773, 86 P.3d at 
omitted} 
Knipe Land Companyv. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,259 P.3d 595 (2011). 
Both parties agree that the Agreement is not ambiguous. 
Bums that the fundamental question at issue in this case is whether Section 
2.b.(iv) of the Agreement excuses for failing to complete construction of the 
at 
within the 18 months arose s to obtain a 
construct a building 
or zonmg does not qualify as a maJeure. 
The Idaho appellate courts have not addressed the issue whether the failure to obtain 
zoning approval may constitute a force eure. URI Partners, L.P. v. Bd. of 
Governors for Higher Education, 915 F.Supp. 1267 (D. R.L 1996), however, the United States 
District Court for the District ofRJ1ode Island addressed the issue of whether plaintiffs inability 
to secure an 
contract's rnajeure clause. The pertinent contractual language URI 
As used in Agreement, "Force Majeure" means causes reasonable 
control of without the fault or negligence of the party claiming 
Majeure. If either Party shall unabie to carry out any of obligations under 
this Agreement due to events beyond the reasonable controi and without the 
or negligence of the party claiming Force Majeure-including, but not 
limited to an act of God; sabotage; accidents; appropriation or diversion steam 
energy, equipment, materials or commodities by rule or order any 
governmental or judicial authority having jurisdiction thereof; any changes in 
applicable laws or regulations affecting performance; war; blockage; insurrection; 
riot; labor dispute; labor or material shortage; fuel storage; fire; explosion; flood; 
nuclear emergency; epidemic; landslide; lightning; earthquake or similar 
catastrophic occurrence-this Agreement shall remain in effect, but the affected 
Party's obligations shall be suspended for the period the affected Party is unable to 
perform because of the disabling circumstances ... 
at 1276. 
21 does not excuse 
5.2(d). case provides guidance in analyzing 
the common law of excuse and force majeure is sufficiently clear that the is 
confident in predicting how the issue would be by Rhode Island 
Supreme Court. 
The Court Appeals of New York has written: 
[C]ontractualforce majeure clauses--or clauses excusing nonperformance 
due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties-under the 
common law provide a ... narrow defense. Ordinarily, only if the force 
clause specifically includes the event that actually prevents a 
performance will that party be excused. 
Kel Corp. v. Central A1arkets, Inc., 70 N.Y.2d 900, N.Y.S.2d 384, 385, 
519 .E.2d (1987) ( citations omitted). Nowhere does ESA § 21 
"failure to obtain zoning approval" anwng the parade of honibles triggering the 
section's application. responds that ESA § includes a catchall 
specifying that events force majeure are limited the 
calamities, and "[ c ]auses beyond reasonable control of' ( and 
occurring without the fault of) UCP suffice. 
In Kel Kim, New York Yvrote that "[t]he 
interpretation applicable to [catchall] clauses is that the general words are not to 
be given expansive meanfog; they are confined to things of the same kind or 
nature as the particular matter mentioned. N.Y.S.2d at 385-386, 519 .E.2d 
at 296-297 ( citing 18 Williston, Contracts § 1968, at 209 (3d ed. 1978)). 
Applying the same canon of interpretation to the present matter, the Court 
declines to extend ESA § to cover zoning defeats. 
What distinguishes the Biblical plagues described in § 21 a to 
procure zoning permission is the question of foreseeability. As the Board points 
out, force mafeure clauses have traditionally applied to unforeseen 
circumstances-typhoons, citizens run amok, Hannibal and his elephants at 
result that the Court will extend § 21 only to those situations 
that were demonstrably unforeseeable at the time of contracting. 
specifically, if the Sout.h Kingstown Town Council were 
September 1990 would the 
majeure A S 
1 
two years the contract was 
parties bickered over whether South 
jurisdiction, whether approval was necessary for financing, 
might seek without the Board historical 
addition, after the 1990 community meeting, everyone knew that the 
townsfolk were turning against the project and that environmental debates 
loomed. Thus it was foreseeable that the South Kingstown Town Council would 
prove less pliable than UCP hoped, that zoning approval would be denied, and 
that the parties would have to cope with the consequences. failure to win 
zoning permission was a foreseeable event, unlike the catastrophes listed in 
§ 21, and not of the nature and kind commonly excused by force majeure clauses. 
UCP and the Board could have provided for this eventuality-instead, left 
everything UCP's hands. 
Which raises the issue of who, under the ESA, bore the risk that zoning would be 
denied. Under the common law, "if governmental approval is required for a 
party's performance, party may be taken to assume the risk that approval will 
be denied if there is no provision excusing the party in that event." 2 Allan 
Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 9.6, at (1 
omitted); see also 6 Corbin, on Contracts, § 1347, at 435 (1962 & 
Supp.1994) ("Ordinarily, when one contracts to render a a 
government license or permit is required, it is his duty to the license or ~=-r~,. 
so he can perform. The risk of inability to obtain it is on him; and its refusal by 
the government is no defense in a suit for breach of his contract.") (footnotes 
omitted); Security Equipment Co. v. J\;fcFerren, 14 Ohio St.2d 251, 7 
N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1 (contractor bore risk that department of health would 
reject plans for construction of sewage treatment plant). UCP undertook chore 
of obtaining financing; ESA § 42 expressly permitted UCP to seek 
approval (and notify the Board) if the partnership decided that financing would be 
unavailable without it. The decision was entirely UCP's-under ESA § 42(l)(ii), 
the partnership could have notified the Board that "it is able to secure construction 
H<~-u-.,u;-, for the system irrespective of any state or local law 
or ordinance zoning." It follows that UCP, having chosen to seek an 
amendment to the zoning code, bore the risk that the South Kingstown Town 
Council would refuse to make the change. UCP made performance of their 
financing obligations contingent upon approval by the South Kingstown 
authorities; hence, the hazard that approval would not forthcoming, and that 
performance would impossible, was theirs. 
a matter § 21 or excuse 
under contract. 
m 
, should not given expansive meaning, but 
confined to things of the same or nature as shortage steel or 
manufacturing equipment." was aware it would need approval for a CUP or zoning 
variance prior to entering the agreement--consequently, the failure to procure the zoning 
variance was foreseeable. Burns states that it could not have foreseen Teton County's denial 
Burns applied for the CUP prior to the parties' execution 
of the Agreement 
executed the Agreement 
adds that Teton County implicitly the 75-foot height when it 
Section 10 of Agreement unambiguously Bums 
to acknowledged that it cannot standard 
for a Additionally, during 2007 public hearing, the Board of 
County Commissioners expressed concerning regarding the plant facility 45 +~11 Lall. 
should foreseen that there was, at a minimum, a risk that its request for a CUP and/or 
zoning variance could or would be denied. Bums and Teton County could have provided for the 
eventuality that a zoning variance would not be obtained. They did not, thereby requiring Burns 
to assume the · of not obtaining 
Bums's failure to complete construction the permanent facility within 18 
months is not excused Teton County's denial of the zoning variance. 
the 
act . It notes that the Commissioners 
authority caimot be influenced by app1ica._<1ts when applying zoning regulations. 
parties rely on Sullivan v. Bullock, l Idaho 738, 864 P.2d 184 (Ct. App. 1993). In 
Sullivan, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated: 
To excuse a party's nonperformance conduct of the party preventing 
performance must be "wTongful" and "in excess of their legal rights." 1 7 A 
Contracts § 468. Other authorities have stated that the conduct of the party 
preventing performance must be outside what was permitted in the contract 
"unjustified," or outside the reasonable contemplation of when 
contract was executed. Godburn v. Meserve, 130 Corm. 723, 37 A.2d (1 
Inc. v. of Human Resources, 10 Kan.App.2d 197, 
450 (1985); Service and Installation Corp., v. 
Education of the City of New York, 28 N.Y.2d 101, 320 N.Y.S.2d 46,268 
(1971 ). Our Supreme Court has echoed this standard in Afolyneux [ v. 
Canal Co., 54 Idaho 619, P.2d 651 (1934)], by stating: 
at the time appellant [ the canal company] ordered respondent 
[A1olyneux ] to stop work, it intended to drill the tunnel additional 
length and then or later should proceed with the tunnel without having 
previously in good faith and pursuant to the contract determined to 
terminate the tunnel, it was obligated to let respondent do the work, and 
it did not permit respondent to do such work appellant would, in such 
case, contract with respondent. 
A.folynein:, 54 Idaho at 629, P.2d at 655 (emphasis added). 
Here, the trial court's instructions to the jury properly reflected this statement of 
the law. . . . The issue of prevention was described instruction twenty-two, 
which follows the theory stated in the act of prevention must have 
unreasonable, in contemplation as 
in contract 
an applicant must site 
variance is not conflict with public interest." § 67-651 Bums 
acknowledges that it not meet of 67-6516 because the 
property without problematic site characteristics." Mem. in Support of M. for Partial 
Summ. J. at 10, n. 4. 
applicable 
Commissioners could not a 
to 
contemplation as 
on the 
Burns to comply with all 
the language of Section 67-6516, the County 
variance to the property in question, it was not 
the zoning actions in 
and was not the 
as set forth in v. Blaine 
County ex rel. Bd. Of Comm 'rs, 147 Idaho 193,207 P.3d 169 (2009). 
Teton County responds Bums cannot satisfy elements of quasi-estoppel. It 
circumstances, which don't exist this case, must be established. 
to 
it has never barred the application 
" it 
1 A 
1 -t 
fell 
proposed subdivision did not fall the MOD. Relying on s op1ruon, 
incurred great to improve the appeat the Supreme Court 
affirmed the board county commissioners, holding that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel was not 
applicable to the case. The Court explained: 
doctrine of quasi-estoppe] when: (1) the offending 
different position than his or her original position, and either (a) the vu.~uuu.,;c:. 
party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the 
other party was induced to change positions; or ( c) it would be unconscionable to 
permit the party to maintain an 
has already derived a benefit or acquiesced m. 
81 186 
at 
Harrell [v. of Lewiston, Idaho 506 P 470 (1 
we held that "[i]n the exercise its police power, which includes the 
enactment and enforcement of zoning regulations, a municipality acts in a 
governmental capacity." [95 Idaho] at 248, 506 P.2d at 475. further 
stated that "[a]lthough a municipality may be estopped in limited 
circumstances, the enactment of zoning regulations is a governmental 
function which is not usually subject to estoppel." Id. at 247, 506 P.2d at 
4 7 4. We determined in Harrell that no exigent reasons existed in that case 
application deciding what extraordinary 
circumstances may merit the application of the doctrine of estoppel in 
future cases. As in Harrell, we again determine that no exigent 
circumstances exist in this case to apply estoppel against the City in the 
of its police power. 
P.2d at 748. 
at 
Most importantly, we are mindful of the precedential decision 
we are asked to make. Applicants would have this Court conclude that opinions 
rendered by staff members effectively bind a board of county commissioners if 
money is expended in reliance on those opinions. If this Court were to apply the 
doctrine of estoppel in the instant case, then all future boards comm1ss1oners in 
similar circumstances would be estopped from disagreeing with the opinions of 
staff members simply because a landowner expended money in reliance on those 
opinions. The effect would be to strip the boards of their sole statutory authority 
to approve or deny subdivision applications, as provided by § 67-6504. 
Accordingly, although we do not reject the proposition that estoppel may be 
applied in appropriate circumstances, we do not find this to be an appropriate 
circumstance. 
, 207 P.3d at 1 
to 
s original position. 
s originally approved of the C, which was 
incorporated the and 
Zoning Commission unanimously a tall 
facility. 
C a building elevation of 7 5 feet, Section 10 of the 
Agreement states "Developer agrees to comply with all federal, state, county and local laws, 
rules which appertain to the subject property." The inclusion building 
not 10 Burns 
cannot 
cannot 
by the 
County Commissioners. 
Furthermore, even if a position different than its original 
position, Bums has not established any exigent circumstances that would vvarrant the application 
quasi-estoppel in this case. Bums 
sufficient to estop Teton County 
as 
Burns's 
the 
permanent facility, should be denied. 
that expenditure of hundreds of thousands of 
Agreement constitutes circumstances 
it from a 75-foot tall facility. 
is insufficient to create 
tolling on of the 
on of 
Bums next asks for summary judgment, rescinding the Agreement. It argues that the 
following 
12 
constitute a repudiation of 
Burns remove the temporary 
a 
Agreement: (1) its October 4, 
terms 18 to 
construct a that because County has 
not '""'",..,,u by demanding that Bums remove the temporary facility 
and rezoning the property. 
previously discussed, 
months as by 
entitled to pursue a rezoning of 
facility 
contract. 
Bums's motion 
failed to construct the permanent facility within 18 
5 of the Agreement, Teton County is 
zoning designation. Because the 
18 
is not in 
of contract 
on 
Bums next asks that the Agreement is held to be void or voidable, that this Court grant 
it summary judgment on its cause enrichment. 
Recovery cannot be had for unjust enrichment where there is an express contract 
covering the same subject matter. Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 101 829 
P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct.App.1991). reason for this presently is that the 
remedies for breach of an express law or by 
afford adequate relief" Chem. 
7 42 (9th Cir.1985). 
contract same matter as at m 
s claim unjust Because the Agreement has not been to 
unenforceable, Bums may not claim unjust enrichment. 
s motion for partial summary judgment on its claim for unjust enrichment should 
denied. 
Teton 
permanent facility 
with 
argues that 
18 
to 
on I of 
breached the greemenr by failing to construct the 
The issues raised by 
on I are 
san1e as those addressed in 
facility within 18 months. 
Bums was required to construct the pem1anent 
to do so is unexcused. 
Teton 
breach of contract. 
Teton County's Motion 
be 
Teton County next seeks summary 
which seeks: 
judgment on I of its Counterclaim 
on its Counterclaim for declaratory 
9 
are on 
summary judgment on I of the Counterclaim for breach contract." m 
entry of 
to 
Teton County's J. at 1 Because Teton County is entitled to summary 
judgment on its contract counterclaim, it is likewise entitled to summary judgment on 
tl:1:rough ( d) Count II of its counterclaim. 
item (e), above, Teton County claims that it is entitled to summary judgment 
uv,~,"'~"'v Burns has not complied with all local laws and regulations, including procurement 
temporary 
Bums responds that 
obtain a building permit or failure to 
as required by the International Building Code, 
with 
facility exceeds the 
International Building 
failure to 
It adds that 
not evidence a building pennit was required. In 
affidavit, Kirk Bums states that met with Kurt Hibbert, Teton County's director of planning 
and ~~''""'- who indicated that a permit was not required for the temporary facility's 
construction. Bums states that County has not submitted a copy of the ordinance 
pertaining to limitation or indicated how 
height inasmuch as the is located in 
June 15, 2010, 
Driggs Code controls the temporary 
County and not Burns adds 
appertain to 
laws or 
Developer to an enforcement action 
jurisdiction. 
lS to with all local laws, rnles and regulations under the 
Although Teton County argues Teton County adopted the 2006 International 
Code, Teton County has not cited which rule or regulation incorporates the IBC. In fact, 
11 or Bums's failure to 
a building pe1n1it the temporary facility. Consequently, Court will not rule on 
Bums IBC and local code 
it state the temporary 
on the 
1 zone." Answer and Counterclaim at 13, ,I 40. The have 
these proceedings the height limit permitted in the 
1 zone is 45 foet Bums knew at the time of its construction that the applicable height limit 
the temporary facility was 45 feet. Although Teton County that this Court hold the 
temporary since March 2009, this Court could not 
find any evidence in record indicating when the temporary facility was constructed. 
Consequently, not make any finding as to the date of non-compliance. 
motion for summary judgment seeking judgment that the 
m 
§ 
to 
1. 
Idaho § 1 11 ) 
othenvise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a 
state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, political subdivision 
or the court including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it that the 
nonprevailing party without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
added). 
Agreement this case included Exhibit which showed a proposed 
to Code§ 117 
§ 
121 the Idaho Code 
In any civil action, award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or 
amend statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The 
term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, 
corporation, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof 
J.R.C.P. 1) provides: 
In any civil action the court may reasonable attorney which at the 
discretion of the court include paralegal to the prevailing or 
Rule provided statute or 
1 121, Idaho 
§ 1 1 is not a matter 
prevailing party, is appropriate only when the in discretion, is 
the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. v. Afichalk, Idaho 
224, 5, 220 P.3d 580, 591 (2009) (citing AfcGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 1, 
562, 82 P.3d 844 While it is a close case, we decline to award 
attorney fees as we are unable to conclude that this appeal was pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without merit. 
Hoover v. Hunter, 150 Idaho 658,664,249 P.3d 1, 857 (2011) (emphasis added). 
Court cannot that 
or without foundation. 
to the 
and costs." 
Under the terms of the Agreement, 
reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
pursued and defended this action frivolously, 
to Idaho § 1 21 should 
party shall bring against the other 
shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees 
County is the prevailing party and entitled to 
Teton County's motion attorney fees pursuant to Section 12( e) of the Agreement 
as 
cause 
s lS 
Bums's non-compliance is not Agreement's force maj eure clause. 
Agreement's force majeure clause does not prevent Teton County from rezoning 
subject property or from enforcing its laws. 
18-month period to construction the permanent facility 
1s in violation County zoning 
lS 
removed. 
and costs pursuant to Section 1 of 
Box 51505 
Idaho Falls, ID 
PROSECUTING 
230 North Main, Suite 125 
ID83455 
& 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE IDAHO, AND FOR COlJNTY 
VS. 
a political 
Counterdefenda11ts Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC (jointly, 
"Bums") deny in the Counterclaim filed June 11, 2013, in 
this civil action Counterclaimant Teton County not expressly admitted hereinbelow. 
L In to 
111 
COUNT I 
1 Burns admits that Teton 
affirmative 
averments in 
averments m 
3. denies averments in paragraph 7 as 
expressly required "to erect and 
defined Temporary Facility. 
4. Burns admits the averments in paragraphs 8 through 12 of the 
Bums denies the 
was to completed pursuant to of the s 
(1 31. 
6. 
substance of the 
7. 
8. 
9. 
m 
14 of Burns 
. . 
rnmor errors m 
Burns denies the averrnents in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Counterclaim. 
Burns admits the averments in paragraph 17 of the Counterclaim. 
Bums the averment in paragraph 18 of the Counterclaim. 
10. In response to paragraphs 19 and 20 of the Counterclaim, Bums denies it 
attached the referenced Exhibit to the admits the 
averments 
states 
Counterclaim. 
statement 
modifies 
Developer's 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
to no 
the averments in the 
admits the averments 
Burns denies the averments in paragraphs through 31 the 
to paragraph 3 2 
averments in 
to 
quoted excerpt from 
terms the "subject 
Burns hereby 
of 
letter accurately sets 
contained in 2. 
or 
18. In response to paragraph 35 the Counterclaim, Burns admits that a force 
majeure clause protects a party to a contract if an obligation cannot be performed due to causes 
that are specified within of the paiiicular clause, such as in the particular dispute 
"delays resulting from ... action beyond Developer's [i.e., Burns'] control." 
19. In response to paragraph the Counterclaim, Burns denies the 
concerns 111 sets 
hearmg. 
3 
2 
averment states a 
to 
states Idaho § 1 l(d). 
averments in paragraph 40 the Counterclaim, 
any height limitation applies to the , \Vhich equipment 
not building or 
In to paragraph 41 the Counterclaim, Burns that one of 
two the Developer's 
defined Permanent 
to 
42 
sets forth full 
paragraph applies 
terms of Paragraph 5 of 
subject to, Burns' 
conditions 
26. Burns denies the averments in paragraphs 43 
Counterclaim. 
s 
to 
45 the 
27. The Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
28. 
Burns in this 
amounts 
action. 
Bums are subject to based on 
on by 111 
on file in this Teton s IS 
equitable 
31. Based on grounds, others, pleaded Burns in its Verified 
Complaint on file in this Teton County's Counterclaim is barred the doctrine of 
performance. 
on those grounds, among pleaded Burns in its Verified 
on file in this Teton s Counterclaim is the doctrine of 
".., 
.) .) . Burns has brought this suit, and filed the 
to the Developer's Agreement. is therefore entitled under of 
its attorney and costs. 
WHEREFORE, Burns prays for judgment on the Counterclaim as follows: 
1. for judgment that the counterclaims against Bums be dismissed and 
County take nothing thereby; 
an award of all costs including 
incurred and 
and 
~ 
DATED this day of December, 2014. 
Rt.'PT.V TO COUNTERCLAIM- 6 Client 2924655.2 
CERTIFICATE OF S
1
Ef VICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _!_~ay of December, 2014, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM to be served 
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Kathy Spitzer 
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
89 N. Main St. , Suite 5 
Driggs, ID 83422 
Facsimile (208) 354-2994 
Ol?Pl V Tf\ rnTTl\TTl<"RrT A TM _ 7 
(X) U.S . Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
\ L( Q 
IN DISTRJCT COURT THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdef endants, 
vs. 
TETON COUNTY, a 
Plaintiffs Burns Concrete, and 
Case No. CV-2013-165 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
RECONSIDERATION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(jointly, move 
pursuant to Rule l l(a)(2)(B), Idaho Rules Procedure, Court's reconsideration of 
its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment, filed December 19, 
2014, and the modification thereof so as to deny Teton County's Motion for summary judgment 
in the 
This motion is based on (i) Burns' supporting memorandum being filed concurrently 
herewith, (ii) Bums' Verified Complaint filed May 21, 201 (iii) Teton County's and 
Counterclaim filed June 11, 2013, (iv) the D. Evans filed August 11, 
and Amended to 

TETON COUNTY 
Main St., Suite 5 
Driggs, ID 83422 
(208) 354.2994 
ATTORNEY 
U Mail, Postage 
( ) Hand Deiivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
1/ 1 0 B 1 " 
COURT 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
CONCRETE, 1NC., an Idaho 
corporation, BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
an Idaho Habilit'f company, 
vs. 
Coonty. ("'Teton 
argmnents in its opposition to the motion by Plaintiffs 
LLC (jointly, .. Burns") requesting 
Summary 
2 l-ll I 3J}0 I 'MJS l -3394-2052. v I 
0 /01 
0 \ 
Holdings, 
-1 
08 1/ 0 3 8 14] 003/0 
wording between those 
include findings of 
of 
Ins. 99.100. (2012); 
Although I.R.C.P. 54(a) has 1, 
was MSJ 
O A 01 
to 
not 
@004/013 
constitute a final 100,gmienr. 
r1""'"""'u c,:mt1:ac1:uru or 
1355, 1358 
February 12 
l)ro{;ess rights 
§ J; 
1217. 
nrr>l' ... -tnrfil statutes which do 
155 
Constitutional Law § 693 
c1atlSCS are limitations on 
o I :/20 O A 0 5/01 
File Amentt,ea 
September 19, 
2014; 
""copied" letter and 
0 AX 
(1981), as 
1985). ~'.iiU:,I:; 
11 1 
it 'Was. 
264 of 
1-,u,,u, ... V. Hodgson. 
of the 
(SECOND) OF 
706 P.2d 1363 
relevant 
008/013 
App. 
mets or 
/0 A 
on 
8 
aoe::erice of oirc:umstances showine: either a t.'"iml.nrr)' 
h1i..c;m lu11 ur cunu1ouung 1auu on tne of the 
the duty. [Citations But 
vcrtormance of 
contract is not an excuse if the cm:un1Stlme1:s 
formation of 
as to indicate that the possibility 
it was 
promiser. 
A p~ "V'V'D-,"'§ ~~h1-,,-,.a'li..:::....1,. l.."'J'""""lf'"','""~!t:i,. le. 'll"lf~ I1Vt. ¥-fl"CV~ .. 
uwu wntcn proviaea !Or me 
surrounding 
the vvarchou;:,c diJ uvl 
-~- --a-L....--3!. 
th~ tenant oould 
use 
refusal to 
007/0 
1' 
,! X O 
to 
In 
states 
the time 
2I813.001'4851-3)'94-2052. vl 
Teton County 
0 01 
had applied for 
(i) 
cannot 
an 
a state law ... is void.'" 
as 
are in 
8 01 / 
now 
A 801 
is statement 
V. 
to excuse 
or is no 
a third party.'' 
of the impossibility 
to those 
occurrence act 
Thus, as comments to OF 
261 was 
it, states a 
in § 261. basic 
lS 
a or governmental regwat:ion or regulation or 
non-occurrence of which was a basic on which the contract was 
exrnatnea in the comments to Section 264: 
Nature of regulation or order. Under the rule 
regulation or may be domestic or It 
level and be, for PV'>mHl'3 
an ru.tn1tmstrnUve =...,,.,_., .. _ 
and technical ,.,...,,,u4.,,,,,..,,,~ 
like are disregarded. 
but a 
Section must 
imposed by § 
§ Cint. b, 
2!81'.Hl0!\4851•:3394-205::tvi 
008/0 
1119, 
is 
§ 
" 
1 . 0 /l. 0 1 
§ 264, cmt a \ vU>b'J'AMa.;,'-> --•~-· ,. 
a variance at 
than oec:nol:is 264 and 261 as 
;:i.ecnon 266(1 ): 
21813.00i'MISl-33~.,2_111 
County's 
means 
And as 
[fl]010/0 
.,,.,.,. ...... ....t Bums to 
266(1>1 
comments to 
o o I o 1 O FAX O 3 811 
D. 
County has repeatedly 
Teton County 
impossibility" 
116. 
Plaintiffs 
Teton County 
a 45-foot concrete 
to 
to 
only fails to 
complied with 
with a 45-foot 
75-foot plant. 
4 U is 
of a concrete 
11, 2013~ 
01 
0 0 A lg]O i01 
not to 
set 
1st 201 
oss 
r Pla.intiffivCounterdefendants 
o I 01 0 FAX 
Driggs, ID 83422 
Fac!:imille: (208) 354.2994 
) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
0 /01 
date: 
Time: 1:38 pm 
Judge: Dane Watkins Jr 
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen 
Attorney Kimberly Ross 
Defendant's Attorney Kathy Spitzer 
l calls case; ids 
court reporter 
- no objection 
- no objections 
J have received three 
limits of motion 
Court entered Memo 
opposition 
As drafted and filed did not comply with Final Judgment 
Burns did not take that as final order 
54 - made some concessions for 
Application was a complete denial of due process 
We believe the motion is 
Raises affirmative 
want court to 
appeal 
Appears Burns was able to comply with the CUP whereas the variance was not applicable 
at all 
145 
~~+-
11VL 
266 1 of restatement 
was not fault 
to court 
It was a Memorandum and Order 
Pretty if rest 
was 
is 
Was it a basic assumption the height of the building would be feet 
Foreseeability that the could be denied 
to 
commissioners expressed sever concern about the height of the building 
They talked to prior 
155 
county was 
not 
about concerns 
one 
out 
.. 
or 
2 -if contract is not 
it is not itis 
is not one that was in control of 
J will matter under advisement 
) 
) 
) 
J 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
) 
of the ) 
) 
) 
I. 
building a concrete 
it within 
had previously that areas within the to 
to construct concrete a 
(commercial) to svI-1 On 26, 2007, 
it 
approved the requested zoning change subject to several conditions, including that 
enter a development agreement. 
height 
structures to feet Burns wished to built a 75-foot structwe on the property. Driggs 
zoning ordinance provided, "[a]ny building or structure or portion thereof hereafter erected shall 
- l 
2007, a hearing was 
to deny 
Follo'\'.'r1ng a court upheld denial 
the COP. On appeal, the Idaho ""~"·=~,~ Court affirmed Teton County .._,._,,.=.,a00Luu,.-1 
holding that a zoning than a 
county was not ,,,,,LLUH,V~ to grant a waiver of the 
The Court 
limitations 
not err 
structure. Teton 
on :SeJ)ternb<:r 13, 2012. On 
a letter revoking Bu:ms's 
CUP. 
Board County 
to operate the To-W,nA~n 
and demanding the facility's removal from the property. 
Bu..us th.en filed this action against 
declaratory contract and unjust On August 11, 2014, Burns 
filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgn1ent on the liability components of its three causes of 
action. 
Teton County a Motion on September 18, 
RECONSIDERATION 2 
a 
to 
(d) temporary facility is in violation of Teton County zoning 
County's revocation of the temporary 
facility must be removed. 
is effective and 
19, Mem. at 
On December 2014, Bums 
on 
Decision Order 
Reconsideration on 19, 
On June 1, 2015, Burns filed a Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
Reconsideration. 
Court held on reconsideration on June 4, 2015. 
2 Although Amended to Counterclaim was not filed until after this Court,,.,.,._,,.."''"' 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment, the motion to 
19, the motion to amend (December 20 
FOR RECONSIDER...\ TION • 
v. Petrovich1 153 l 1 
motion for summary judgment 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genume as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
law." 56(c). v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105; Rockefeller v. 
Grabow, 136 Ida.ho 637, is, at all times, on the party to 
P.3d 
V. 
The United m V. 317, 
986), 
Of comse, a seeking summary judgment alv,1ays bears the initial 
responsibility infonning the district court the basis its motion, 
identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on :file, together with the affidavits, if any," which 
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But unlike 
Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that 
the moving mth affidavits or other similar materials 
negating the opponent's claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to 
affidavits, if any'' ( emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement. 
And if there were any doubt about meaning of Rule 56(c) in tbis regard, such 
doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide the claimants and 
defendants) respectively, may move for summary judgment "-with or without 
supporting affidavits" added). these subsections is that, 
regardless of whether tl1,e party accompanies its 
,.i 
at 
are to 
137 54 judgment, a 
court is not permitted to the evidence to 
Lott, 
at 
Idaho 846, 993 609 (2000). Liberal construction of the facts favor of the non-
party the court to draw U1 non-
party. Farnworth v. 134 999 P.2d 892 (2000); v. Roth, I 
802, 10 1 (Ct. 
Su.T,.rmuy is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural 
.... ~....,,~,,. but rather as an of the Federal Rules as a whole, 
designed secure just, speedy .and inexpensive determination 
action." .. 56 must construed with du.e not on1y for rights of 
persons asserting and defenses that are adequately to 
Those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the persons 
opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in manner provided by the 
Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis. 
at see Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 
137 Idaho 747, 53 P.3d 330 (2002); Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 1 473, P.3d 488 
a summary cannot merely rest on 
a 
1/, 
, 136 ldaho 220 (2001). 
movmg is entitled to Judgment to a 
at trial. Primary Health Nenvork, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Admin., Idaho P.3d 307 
Facts cease to "material" when plaintiff foils to establish a prima 
case. Post Falls Trailer Park v. Frede kind, 131 Idaho 634, 1018, (1998). In such 
of proof 
immaterial Id 
trial court is not permitted to the or resolve 
controverted factual when ruling on a motion for judgment. AID 
Ins. v. Armstrong, 119 Idaho 897, 900, 811 P.2d 507, 510 (Ct.App.1991). 
However, the "evidentiary facts are not disputed the court 
than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the 
possibility conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible 
for resolving the conflict between those inferences." Riverside Development Co. 
v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982). See also AID Ins. Co., 
119 Idaho at 900, 811 P .2d at 510 (if the court will be ultimate finder of fact, 
both parties have moved for summary judgment and the motions are based on the 
same evidentiary facts, then "summary judgment is appropriate even though 
conflicting inferences are possible, so long as all the evidence is confined entirely 
to the Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469, 470, 700 P.2d 91, 92 
(Ct.App.1985) (when the judge will be the fact, to arrive 
at the most probable to be evidentiary 
facts). 
State, Idaho p 5 11 
V, 
1 
Court to 
irn.possibility doctrine, as plead in Amended Reply to Counterclaim, 
excuses _n,,,'i"'l'n,""""''"' 1'"' and Sw"'Tlillary judgment should no't: have been granted to 
responds is untimely that the doctrine of 
Comity 
argues 
judgment because it resolved all in this case. It argues triat Rule l l(a)(2){B) only 
allows for reconsideration of interlocutory orders Bums, therefore, should filed a Rule 
to 
for reconsideration because it was filed more than days 
19, 
deteITI1ination 
FOR 
entry of the December 
7 
suit, adjudicates 
rig._hts. 
at time the not 
( 14) days after the entry of for reconsideration of 
of the court made after final judgment may be 
(14) from fue entry of such order; provided, there shall no 
motion for reconsideration of an order of trial court entered on any motion 
under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 59(a), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b). 
LR.C.P. 59(e) provides: motion to alter or amend the judgrnent be not 
LR.C.P. 54(a) 
"Judgment" as means a separate document entitled 
"Judgment" or "Decree". A shall state the relief to which a party is 
entitled on one or more relief the action. relief can include 
dismissal \vith or v,rithout prejudice. A judgment not a of 
the of a master, record of prior proceedings, 
legal reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions lcr.v. A judgment 1s 
either it has been certified as final to subsection fo)(l) of this or 
judgment has been entered on all claims for relief, except costs and asserted 
by or against all in the action_ A judgment sh.all begin v;ith words 
"JTJDG,MENT IS ENTEP...ED AS FOLLOWS: .. , " it shall not contain any 
other wording between words and the caption. judgment ca_n include any 
findings of fact or conclusions law expressly by or 
regulation. 
added). 
2015, Idaho Supreme Court entered an Order .... u,,~"~'= Re: Finality 
of Judgments Entered Prior to April 15, 20]5_ The Order states: 
\VHEREAS there are a number of judgments that been previously entered 
that do not comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) or Rule of 
Law Procedure 
- 8 
a 
did this Memorandu111 Decision to 
December 19, Order was an interlocutory and l'fiis 
Court has not yet entered judgment Consequently, does not 
for reconsideration and motion is timely under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). 
Teton County also argues that motion 
Memorandum 
opportunity to 
proposed 
Bums replies 
of the August 11, 4 
memorandum support thereof, 
in ai.1 amended 
explains that it never had 
was never a 
to Amended to Counterclaim and the 
September 19, 2014 Notice of Hearing Re: Motion to File 
lunended Reply to Counterclaim, and the December 2014 Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion 
to File Amended Pleading. 
November 20, 2014 at which this Court stated it would Bums's motion to amend. 
Court minutes from 2014, court hearing indicate that both and 
Teton the motion to 
the was 
FOR RECONSIDERATION· 
not 
to 
Counterclaim_ 
Burns at time the 
Court would hold, as it did in Bums Holdings, LLC 11. Teton County Bd. of 
Com 152 Idaho 440,272 P.3d 412 that the Driggs zoning ordinance (Driggs, Idaho, 
§ 13(c)), which prohibited structures from exceeding 45 in height unless a 
Use Planning was obtained, was void § 67-65 of the Local 
contract 
Teton County responds that impossibility doctrine not apply to this case because 
was always aware a height 
cites Johnson v. County, 146 Idaho 916, 204 PJd 1127, 1136 
(2009) and Arthur v. Shoshone Co., 133 Idaho 854, 993 P.2d 617 (Ct. App_ 2000), for 
proposition that a conflict between the LL UP A 
impossibility a.oc:trn:Le. 
a local ordinance does not implicate the 
In Sutheimer v_ Stoltenberg, 127 Idaho 81, 85, 896 P.2d 989, 993 (1995), the Idaho Court 
of Appeals explained the application. of the doctrine of impossibility: 
Haessly v_ Safeco Title 
1121 (1992), the Idaho 
Idaho 463, 465, 825 P.2d 1119, 
that the doctrine of impossibility 
bargained-for performance is no 
to 
10 
1 Idaho Court 
where anew or creates an 
Landis involved a 
balance on a contract the sale of a 
the State Idaho. The State had the property to 
predecessors for many 
judge ruled that 
which 
State's decision not to reuew a on property 
for the purchaser to fulfill the contract. 
cte1errrunrng whether non~occurrence a event was a 
a will look at all the circUcrnstances, including the of the 
contract. fact that the was unforeseeable is significant in suggesting 
non-occurrence v>1as a basic assumption. the event was not 
reasonably foreseeable when the contract was made, party claiming v..,...,,,~,= 
hardly be to provided against its occurrence. However, if it was 
or even foreseen, the opposite conclusion does not 
necessarily follow." RESTATEME1'.ff (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261, 
comment (c) (1981). 
such superseding event has been the government imposition of a new lcnv, 
or which makes the performance of a duty impractical. 
RESTATElvfENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § (1981). 
perfonnai.1ce becomes impractical, i.e., if the order or regulation was an event the 
non-occurrence of which was assumed at the time the contract was made, the 
-Kat'"""' will be relieved of his duty to perfo1m. Where a contract is executed 
involving a which requires the permission of government officers, the fact 
that such permission is not forthcoming required has been held not to 
17A C.J.S. COl'ffRACTS § 463(1) 
v. Hotel Trinidad, 29 So.2d 696 1 
1 
~ 11 
was founded on 
unconditionally, the risk of 
should become impossible by 
circumstances beyond bis unjust consequences of general 
ntle gave to certain exceptions. One of these is that a contractual duty 
is discharged where performance is subsequently prevented or prohibited 
by a judicial, executive, or administrative order, in the absence of 
circ:umstcmces showing either a contrary intention or contributing fault on 
the part of the person subject to the duty. [Citations omitted.] But an order 
which interferes with the performance of the contract is not an excuse if 
the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract are such as to 
indicate that the possibility of such interference was recognized and the 
risk of it was assumed by pro mis or. 
is cited as authority in Acme }.foving and Storage Corporation v. Bower, 
478,306 A.2d 545 (1973). In Acme, a agreement was for 
'"'"'-'"""''"'· The landlord had to obtain a variance to a totally 
was su.bj ect to ten 
ivk~~~ ... ,0 , landscaping, parking and vehicular access. landscaping 
submitted to the county pla..11!11ng board 
however, it was not approved. The board promulgated o,\fJJ plan which 
provided the removal of a chain-link fence and a sidewalk surrounding the 
buildings. Without the fence sidew:;ilk: i:he warehouse did not comply v.rith the 
~~··=,-, law as a totally enclosed and could not receive a use and 
occupancy permit which was required in the lease. The Maryland Court of 
Appeals held the tenant not sue for specific perfonnance of the No 
fault was found on the part of landlord in to obtain the use and 
occupancy permit. There was no suggestion that the refusal to issue the use and 
occupancy permit was foreseeable or that the landlord assumed the risk such 
refusal. Therefore, the defense of :impossibility of performance was properly 
available to him. 
Here we b,ave a similar The district court found that Hodgson was not at 
fault, that he had maintained the hotel in good condition meeting the state 
requirements. The district court allowed Hodgson to testify about his 
understanding of the lease agreement with the state. He testified he thought the 
would be continued indefinitely based on the longevity the hotel 
assurances by the superintendent the Heyburn 
not cancel the lease .... 
at 706 at 
the 
1 Id~ho 
state regulation 
Idaho § 67-6516, which was in existence at time the parties executed the 
states: 
.,,u,..u..t._,..., is a modification of the bulk and placement requirements the 
,..=,uu--- as to lot: size, lot coverage, width, depth, front yard, yard, rear 
.~~-,,~~- parking space, height of buildings, or other ordinance provision 
the size or shape of a structure or the placement of the structure upon 
or of lots. A variance shdll not be considered a right or special 
privilege, but may be granted to an applicant of undue 
hardship of characteristics the is not in 
conflict with the interest. 
the Supreme has explained, a CUP not allow variances 
A CUP concerns the proposed use of property, not the 
requirements such as height of buildings. Idaho 
6512(a) provides: 
special use permit may be granted to an applicant if 
conditionally permitted by the terms of the 
conditions pursuant to specific provisions the to 
ability of political subdivisions, including school districts, to provide 
services for the proposed use, and when it is not in conflict with the plan. 
In addition, proposed use must be prescribed wit.1nn the zoning ordinance. 
Gardiner, 148 Idaho at 767, 229 P.3d at "If the ordinance does not 
a proposed use, it is not eligible for a conditional/special use 
229 P.3d at 373. waiver of a ordinance 
13 
a 
10. Developer agrees to comply with all 
county and local laws, rules and regulations, which appertain to 
property. Developer's failure to comply with laws or 
Agreement Vvill subject Developer to an enforcement action by 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
Section 10 of the Agreement indicates that the nc,rt,,,c contemplated possible :interference 
with construction state laws and that Burns of 
is no genuine fact that compliance with § 67-6516 was reasonably 
to 
is inapplicable to the of this case. Furthermore, inability to construct 
permanent facility was not caused by the Supreme 
of a limit on all stru.cttrres within Driggs Area of 
existed prior to the Agreement's execution. There is no genuine issue of material fact that 
Bums' s inability to fulfill the Agreement was not caused by the "imposition a new law, 
regulation or order. Landis, 109 Idaho at 256, 706 P.2d at 1367. 
Bums's motion for reconsideration, based on 
both 
costs.'' 
Under the terms of the Agreement, Teton County is 
reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
party entitled to 
Teton County's request for attorney 
should be granted_ 
pursuant Section 12( e) of the Agreement 
County is entitled to <>T"l'r,,-,-,""' Section 12( e) of the Agreement, 
t1ns Court need not '-'V.LLJJ.U.Vk whether Idaho an 
motion reconsideration is denied. 
County's request for attorney 1s 
DATED this~"~ day of ~ U[\~ 2015. 
-
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FIELDS, CHARTERED 
Box 51505 
Falls, ID 83405 
Spitzer 
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING 
230 North Main, 125 
Driggs, ID 83455 
u or t~ ' 2 p 
16 
INC., 
anldahocorporation,and 
HOLDINGS, an 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
V. 
COUNTY, a political subdivision 
of the State of Idaho, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
The Court hereby enters judgment in favor ofDefendant/Counterclaimant Teton 
County, Idaho, and against Plaintiffs/Counterdefendant Burns Concrete, Inc. and Bums 
LLC, granting relief pursuant to the tenns of this Court's "·~--~0.~00nrn,,'""' 
and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment entered on 
Complaint in the above entitled action is hereby dismissed be 
deemed as a Final Judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(a). 
IT 

Boise, 
Telephone: 562-4900 
b bond@parsons behle. com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, 
ntv1E: _____ _ 
TETOrJ CO. \D 
IN DISTRICT COURT OF SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF IDAHO, 
BURNS an corporation, 
BUR.NS HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability 
TETON COlJ1'-JTY, a political 
of Idaho, 
of 
Defendant/Counterclaimant/Respondent. 
COUNTY OF TETON 
No. CV-2013-165 
THE 
TO THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, TETON COUNTY, IDAHO, AND ITS 
ATTORNEY: 
Kathy Spitzer 
Teton County Prosecuting 
N. Main Street, Suite 5 
Driggs, Idaho 83422 
5, 
a to to the 
described paragraph 1 is appealable and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l), 
3. The appellants' preliminary statement of the issues on appeal is as follows: 
a. Did the district court err in ruling that the doctrine of impossibility 
not or the appellants' obligation under the subject 
s Agreement the concrete 
(the described in 
court err the (of 
performance) did not or discharge under subject 
Faciiity? 
C. district court err ruling that the force majeure in the 
subject Developer's Agreement did not suspend the appellants' obligation under the subject 
Developer's Agreement for the construction of the Permanent Facility? 
Did court err 
breach the subject Developer's Agreement? 
e. Did court err ruling that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel 
not applied to estop the respondent from rezoning the appellants' 
6. to included in s 
together additional automatically included under 28(b )(1 ), 
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